History is full of examples of the rise and fall of great powers and their empires. Roman, Ottoman, Mughal, Britain, and the Soviet Union etc. Now it is America’s turn.
After World War II, the United States became a global hegemon, facilitated by its unmatched military might, economic supremacy, technological edge, and institutional leadership in bodies like the United Nations and Bretton Woods system. This “American empire” shaped international norms, trade, and security. Yet, by late 2025, that edifice appears precarious. This foundation has been undermined by China and India’s growing influence, the Global South’s push for autonomy via forums like BRICS, the U.S. dollar’s decreased dominance, and widespread opposition to U.S. interventions. This is evident in recent events, such as the U.S.-Venezuela oil dispute and the unusual 2025 G20 Summit boycott. Such events mirror previous disagreements, like the U.S.’s 2023 pressure on Nigeria concerning oil theft and currency reforms, where Washington’s coercive methods distanced an African giant and expedited its move toward Chinese financial support. Recent events indicate China capitalising on North American disunity.
The Venezuela Oil Standoff: Coercion Backfiring in a Multipolar World
The Trump administration’s aggressive policy toward Venezuela shows how U.S. unilateralism harms allies while assisting rivals. In February 2025, Trump overturned Biden’s policies by canceling General License 41, which had let Chevron, the final significant U.S. oil company there, extract and sell Venezuelan crude. This triggered a six-month wind-down, cutting Chevron’s joint ventures, which produced around 25% of Venezuela’s output. By March, Trump used a 25% tariff on Venezuelan oil imports to target buyers such as China and India, in order to hurt Caracas’s $20-30 billion annual revenue.
The direct consequences have been striking. Venezuela’s oil output, which had recovered to roughly 1 million bpd in early 2025 due to eased sanctions, is now expected to fall to 800,000 bpd because of supply issues and lack of investment. Because US Gulf Coast refineries were made for Venezuela’s heavy sour crude, they now have a 150,000-200,000 bpd shortfall, causing costly substitutions from Canadian tar sands or Middle Eastern residues, which may increase US gasoline prices by up to $5 per barrel.
But Washington’s loss of power in Latin America is a greater geopolitical setback. Instead of isolating Maduro, these actions hastened Venezuela’s shift toward non-Western nations. China, which has been Venezuela’s biggest lender since 2005 with $60 billion in loans, has increased its investment. In May 2025, China Concord Resources Corp. signed a 20-year production-sharing agreement for two Lake Maracaibo fields. It has invested over $1 billion to increase output from 12,000 to 60,000 bpd by 2026. PDVSA - Venezuela’s state-owned oil and natural gas company - gets lighter crude, but heavier oil goes straight to China, avoiding US tariffs using “shadow fleets” and crypto payments; Maduro uses this to dodge sanctions, laundering about 2 billion dollars yearly via digital assets.
Moreover, Colombia and Brazil are building energy ties with Caracas, forming an “energy autonomy” bloc. Colombian President Gustavo Petro stated in November 2025 that U.S. pressure is about oil, not democracy. Venezuela’s defiance empowers post-dollar vision of the BRICS. Consequently, in long-term this would result in U.S. isolation, with oil possibly traded in yuan or rupees, decreasing the petrodollar’s 40% market share.
The G20 Boycott: A Snub That Exposes U.S. Irrelevance
Compounding the Venezuela debacle, a historic rupture was caused by the U.S. boycott of the November 22-23, 2025, G20 Summit in Johannesburg. The U.S. was unrepresented as Trump banned officials, falsely claiming “genocide” against South African farmers. Trump called the event a “total disgrace”. But the summit went ahead. It finalised a key 122-point agreement. This declaration addressed climate resilience, debt, inequality, and minerals, which Washington had previously blocked. Host Cyril Ramaphosa hailed it as proof the G20’s legitimacy “doesn’t hinge on the U.S.”. China’s Xi Jinping sent Premier Li Qiang, Russia dispatched a deputy due to ICC warrants, and Argentina’s Javier Milei was also absent in support of Trump, but despite this, the 17 leaders present, who together represent 75% of the world’s GDP, reached an agreement.
Trump’s boycott of the summit was denounced as “imperialist meddling with racial bias,” hurting an African-led forum. But it has boosted the Global South’s drive for alternatives like the G77+China bloc. Brazil’s Lula da Silva called the result a “triumph of multilateralism,” and Canadian PM Mark Carney said the world “can move on without the United States.”
As the dollar’s dominance wanes (BRICS nations now trade 28% of oil outside it), and institutions like the G20 evolve without the U.S., unilateralism risks turning America into a “spoiler,” as scholars like Joseph Nye warn—eroding soft power faster than hard power can compensate.
Two Paths Forward: Entrenchment or Adaptation?
More isolation would be risky for the United States. Continued pressure could push Venezuela closer to China and Russia. OPEC expects Venezuela to export 1.2 million barrels of oil per day to Asia by 2030. Latin America may also integrate through groups like Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), reducing U.S. influence. G20 boycotts are creating a form of diplomacy that works without the U.S., while BRICS is moving ahead with plans for a $50 billion development bank by 2027. The dollar is also under pressure: if 20% more oil is traded in other currencies, U.S. Treasury yields could rise by 1–2%, according to Federal Reserve models, worsening America’s $35 trillion debt burden. U.S. allies such as Europe and Japan are already hedging with euro–yuan currency swaps. They could drift further away, leaving Washington looking “volatile and unpopular” and more dependent on military power—much like Britain after the Suez crisis.
However, practical re-engagement may provide recovery. Rejoining multilateralism could temper decline: Diplomacy in Venezuela (e.g., conditional license renewals, as in July 2025) stabilises energy flows; G20 participation rebuilds moral authority. By focusing on alliances such as AUKUS and QUAD and attracting the Global South with debt swaps, the U.S. can become the leader in areas like AI ethics or green tech, where it has a 40% market share. Full hegemony is illusory, but shared influence preserves leverage: A 2025 CSIS report estimates adaptive U.S. policy could retain 70% of current sway by 2035, versus 50% under confrontation.
Global Ripples: Opportunities for the Rest
This junction changes the game for others. India gets strategic advantage from Russian oil ties and the G20, plus Chabahar’s role. African nations, like Nigeria and Ethiopia, have increased influence: Johannesburg’s success confirms AU-G20 partnerships, attracting $500 billion for minerals without US control. Latin America looks to gain sovereignty via PetroCaribe 2.0. The Global South is also advancing “contested multipolarity” with sovereign tech, regional currencies, and forums. The original PetroCaribe was a regional oil deal between Venezuela and Caribbean countries. Hugo Chávez was president when the trade organisation was established in Puerto La Cruz, Venezuela, on June 29, 2005. Venezuela offered oil to member states, with favourable financial terms. PetroCaribe played a role in the Latin American “pink tide,” aiming for post-neoliberal progress.
China-Canada-Mexico Form Anti-US Economic Unity
China, Canada, and Mexico may potentially form an economic alliance against the United States. This will result in deeper shifts in North America’s strategic environment. Such a trio would draw together America’s largest trading partners and its principal global rival, China, to create an unusual coalition that blends geographic proximity with geopolitical intent. Even without a formal treaty, coordination among these three economies could undercut the most important pillars of U.S. economic power: market access, supply-chain dominance, and regional leadership.
China would be the strategic driver. Beijing could use an alliance with Canada and Mexico to bypass the U.S.A.’s control over North American trade. China could lessen its reliance on U.S. markets by collaborating with America’s neighbours, protect itself from Washington’s export controls, and directly influence U.S. supply chains. China’s industrial strategy avoids U.S. constraints, particularly in EVs, batteries, rare earths, and solar. This would be reinforced through greater collaboration with Canada’s minerals and Mexico’s cheap manufacturing.
Canada would be motivated by both economic and political factors. Ottawa and Washington have faced strain due to disagreements over security, tech, and trade. Canada could gain leverage and diversify its market by opening its economy to China and Mexico. Meanwhile, Canada has huge stores of essential minerals like lithium, nickel, and cobalt, which China needs. A joint structure could solidify lasting investment and guarantee demand, while Ottawa keeps its official U.S. links.
Mexico’s strategy is similarly practical. Its economy depends heavily on the U.S., yet it has secretly used China for development, mainly through Chinese factories that re-label goods for North American trade advantages. Mexico could gain leverage with Washington on migration, energy, and industry by partnering more with China and Canada. China’s intricate manufacturing supply chains could also help Mexico, which can work well with its industrial areas close to the U.S. border.
The United States could experience severe consequences. Its supply chain’s resilience would decline first. A strong production system could emerge near America, blending China’s manufacturing with Canada and Mexico’s strengths. Industries like batteries, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and clean energy might use inputs influenced by Chinese standards and funding. This would weaken Washington’s bid to onshore or “friend-shore” sensitive technologies.
Next, U.S. trade influence would decline. The U.S. has for a while controlled North American trade via NAFTA and the USMCA. Any kind of cooperation between the three would weaken America’s ability to enforce standards. U.S. businesses could be at a disadvantage in North America if Mexico and Canada use China’s trade model.
Moreover, the geopolitical symbolism would cause damage. The U.S. has always had influence in the Western Hemisphere. China gaining economic power next-door to the U.S. would be a big strategic problem. It would prove that U.S. alliances are no longer assured and that economic interdependence is unreliable.
Even if the alliance never crystallises formally, the very trend toward it would push Washington to confront a new reality: American dominance in North America is no longer automatic, and its rivals are learning to operate inside its front yard rather than across the ocean.
Conclusion: Decline Isn’t Doom
America’s $28 trillion GDP, 800 overseas bases, and innovation ecosystem endure. But as Venezuelan fields pump for Beijing and the G20 ignores Washington, the peril is relative erosion—not extinction. These crises are warning signals, not small details. A one-sided empire only becomes more isolated, while flexible leadership helps a country survive in a world with many power centres. The big question of this decade is whether the U.S. will remain a superpower or become just one among several equals. Will it negotiate or intimidate? The stakes are rising, and any U.S. misstep could reshape the entire world.
Trump, G-20, Johannesburg, Caracas, Venezuela, Xi Jinping, Putin, India, Crude Oil, Russia, Argentina, NAFTA, Brazil, Mexico, Canada, Hugo Chávez , OPEC, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Lake Maracaibo, Green Tech, AUKUS, QUAD, PetroCaribe
