Reforming Legacy or Rebranding Retreat?

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A Sardonic Critique of the VB-G RAM G and SHANTI Bills and the Art of Governing by Dilution

Introduction: When Reform Means Subtraction with Better Fonts

The NDA government’s legislative imagination in its third term appears animated by a single, unifying philosophy: everything must change, especially the names, while the burden quietly shifts downward. Under the grand banner of Viksit Bharat @2047, a vision document so elastic that it can accommodate almost any policy rollback as “reform,” the government has begun dismantling two of independent India’s most consequential frameworks—rural employment guarantees and nuclear liability protections—while insisting that the dismantling itself is progress.

Enter two emblematic bills: the Viksit Bharat–Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Bill (VB-G RAM G) and the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Bill (SHANTI). Together, they seek to replace the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), 2005, and substantially rewrite the logic of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLND), 2010.

On paper, both bills are sold as modernisation exercises. One promises more employment days; the other promises more clean energy. In practice, both represent a familiar pattern: convert enforceable rights into administratively rationed schemes, and convert public risk into private profit—underwritten, naturally, by the taxpayer.

The VB-G RAM G and SHANTI Bills do not merely reform legacy laws; they redefine the relationship between the Indian state and its citizens, shifting from obligation to discretion, from accountability to opacity, and from precaution to calculated exposure. What is being dismantled is not inefficiency, but democratic friction itself.

MGNREGA: A Law That Refused to Ask Permission from the Treasury

MGNREGA, enacted in 2005, was not merely a welfare programme; it was a constitutional provocation. By guaranteeing 100 days of wage employment as a legal right, it inverted the traditional hierarchy of Indian development policy. Instead of citizens pleading for work, the state became legally obligated to provide it—or pay an unemployment allowance.

Its defining features were deliberately inconvenient to administrators.

At the heart of MGNREGA lay a design that was deliberately resistant to bureaucratic convenience. Employment was demand-driven, meaning work had to be provided whenever rural households asked for it, rather than being rationed through pre-fixed quotas or budgetary ceilings decided in distant offices. This legal entitlement was reinforced by the provision of an unemployment allowance, payable if work was not offered within 15 days, turning administrative delay into a financial liability for the state rather than a silent punishment for workers. Transparency and accountability were embedded through mandatory social audits conducted by Gram Sabhas, which allowed local communities to scrutinise muster rolls, spending, and asset creation in open forums, making corruption politically and socially costly. Crucially, the scheme rested on near-total central funding of wages, recognising the unequal fiscal capacities of Indian states and ensuring that a worker’s right to employment did not depend on the solvency or political priorities of their state government. Together, these features made MGNREGA not just a welfare programme, but a rights-based architecture that compelled the state to respond to distress rather than manage it away.

MGNREGA’s impact was uneven but undeniable. It became a counter-cyclical stabiliser, expanding during droughts, economic slowdowns, and most dramatically during the COVID-19 pandemic, when rural distress surged and demand for work reached historic highs. Female labour participation under the scheme hovered near 50%, partly due to worksite facilities like crèches and proximity to villages.

Importantly, MGNREGA’s greatest sin was not inefficiency but stubbornness. It refused to shrink quietly during fiscal consolidation cycles. It demanded money when the economy faltered. It embarrassed governments that preferred infrastructure ribbon-cuttings to wage payments.

VB-G RAM G: The Promise of More, Delivered Through Less

The VB-G RAM G Bill claims to improve upon MGNREGA by increasing the employment guarantee from 100 to 125 days, indexing wages to inflation, streamlining payments through digital platforms, and integrating works with flagship infrastructure and housing schemes. On the surface, it reads like a benevolent upgrade.

The catch—revealed only after the applause—is structural.

VB-G RAM G abolishes the demand-driven nature of employment and replaces it with a budget-normative model. In plain language, work will now be provided up to the limits of pre-approved allocations, not up to the limits of human need. The right to work quietly becomes the possibility of work, contingent on fiscal comfort.

This is not a minor procedural tweak; it is the conceptual burial of MGNREGA’s rights-based core. Without guaranteed funding tied to demand, the legal obligation evaporates. The scheme survives, but the right does not.

Federalism by Invoice: States Pick Up the Bill

MGNREGA’s financing model—100% central funding for wages—was a recognition of unequal state capacities. VB-G RAM G dismantles this logic by imposing a Centre–State cost-sharing formula for wages, materials, and administration.

For fiscally stressed states, especially those with high rural poverty or limited revenue bases, this is not decentralisation; it is cost transfer. States are now expected to either finance shortfalls or quietly restrict access. Predictably, implementation will vary wildly, deepening inter-state inequality while allowing the Centre to claim success in aggregate numbers.

The omission of unemployment allowance further erodes accountability. Under MGNREGA, delayed work meant financial penalties for the state. Under VB-G RAM G, delay simply means silence.

Technology as Alibi

VB-G RAM G leans heavily on Aadhaar-linked job cards, real-time attendance systems, and centralised dashboards. Efficiency is the selling point; exclusion is the side effect.

Experience from multiple welfare schemes shows that authentication failures, biometric mismatches, and digital illiteracy disproportionately affect the elderly, women, and migrant workers. Under a rights-based law, such exclusions could be challenged. Under a scheme, they become “implementation issues.”

Even social audits—MGNREGA’s most radical transparency mechanism—are diluted into administrative reviews conducted by district officials. The Gram Sabha, once a watchdog, is demoted to an audience.

The Politics of Renaming

Removing “Mahatma Gandhi” from the law’s title is more than symbolic housekeeping. It reflects a deeper ideological discomfort with rights-bearing citizenship associated with the UPA era. VB-G RAM G does not merely replace a programme; it reframes poverty as a logistical problem rather than a political obligation.

The result is a scheme that promises more days but delivers fewer guarantees—a familiar paradox in contemporary Indian governance.

SHANTI: Nuclear Power, Now with Optional Accountability

India’s nuclear governance architecture was intentionally conservative. The Atomic Energy Act centralised control under the state to prevent proliferation risks, while the CLND Act—crafted amid intense debate—sought to balance foreign investment with victim protection.

The CLND’s most controversial feature was supplier liability. Section 17(b) allowed operators to seek recourse from suppliers in cases of defective equipment or services. Section 46 preserved victims’ rights to pursue additional claims under other laws.

These provisions made foreign suppliers uncomfortable. They also made Indian citizens marginally safer.

SHANTI: Safety Streamlined for Investor Confidence

The SHANTI Bill promises a nuclear renaissance—100 GW by 2047, small modular reactors, private participation, and alignment with global climate goals. To achieve this, it does something radical: it removes the legal irritants that scared investors away.

Supplier liability is no longer statutory; it is contractual. If a supplier negotiates immunity—and powerful suppliers always do—victims have no recourse. The tort gateway of Section 46 quietly disappears, replaced by capped liability and government-funded compensation pools.

In effect, risk is socialised, profit is privatised, and accountability is negotiable.

Private Operators, Public Consequences

Allowing private and joint-venture entities to build and operate nuclear reactors marks a philosophical shift. Nuclear energy is no longer an exceptional domain demanding extraordinary caution; it becomes another investment opportunity, complete with viability-gap funding and regulatory flexibility.

The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board is granted statutory status, but remains institutionally tethered to the same executive ecosystem it is meant to regulate. Independence, it seems, is largely semantic.

India’s nuclear accident history is limited not because the risks are low, but because expansion has been slow. SHANTI accelerates capacity while weakening deterrence, a combination that history—from Bhopal to Fukushima—suggests is unwise.

Climate Goals as Cover

Nuclear energy’s contribution to India’s power mix remains modest compared to renewables, whose capacity expansion has been far faster and cheaper. Yet nuclear enjoys a rhetorical premium because it allows policymakers to appear climate-conscious without confronting fossil fuel dependencies or distributional energy access issues.

SHANTI leverages climate urgency to justify liability dilution. The planet must be saved, we are told, even if the villagers near reactor sites must accept capped compensation and limited legal remedies.

Conclusion: Reform Without Responsibility

The VB-G RAM G and SHANTI Bills are not aberrations; they are expressions of a governing philosophy that prefers administrative flexibility over legal obligation, market comfort over citizen security, and narrative triumph over institutional memory.

VB-G RAM G transforms a constitutional aspiration—the right to work—into a fiscally managed programme whose generosity fluctuates with budget arithmetic. SHANTI transforms nuclear governance from a precautionary regime into a facilitative one, where safety is assumed, liability is capped, and the state stands ready as insurer of last resort.

Both laws share a common impulse: remove friction, whether that friction is a rural worker demanding employment or a citizen demanding accountability after a disaster.

If Viksit Bharat means development without rights, growth without guarantees, and reform without responsibility, then these bills are indeed visionary. But history suggests that nations are not ultimately judged by how efficiently they attract capital or rename schemes, but by how steadfastly they protect their most vulnerable when the spreadsheets fail.

True reform evolves institutions; it does not hollow them out and repaint the façade.

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NSS 2025: America Finally Stops Pretending to Save the World and Starts Saving Itself (or So It Claims)

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Prologue: The Day Atlas Filed for Medical Leave

The unpredictable Donald Trump has done it again, and how!

December 2025 shall forever be remembered as the month America made its grand announcement to humanity: Listen, world, our back hurts. We carried you through the Cold War, the War on Terror, the War on Poverty, the War on Drugs, the War on Common Sense... and now we’re done.

Yes, the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) is essentially a doctor’s certificate for Atlas, declaring him unfit for further heavy lifting. After decades of cracking under the self-imposed responsibility of supporting the world order, Washington has finally admitted it would like to lie down, apply a warm compress, and focus on stretching exercises like “reshoring,” “sovereignty yoga,” and “border security deep breathing.”

Gone are the days when the U.S. would solemnly declare that freedom, democracy, human rights, and carbon neutrality were moral imperatives. The new script proclaims that such things are still loveable in theory but vastly inconvenient in practice—especially when tariffs can achieve the same purpose with fewer sermons.

The NSS 2025 is, therefore, not just a strategy document. It is a memoir, a midlife crisis, a reluctant confession, and perhaps even a breakup letter to the world order it once passionately courted. And like all breakup letters, it insists that “it’s not you… it’s us,” while simultaneously hinting that actually it is you, Europe, with your silly migration policies and dependence on Russian gas.

Sovereignty, Strength, Self-Reliance: America Rejoins the Gym

The NSS proudly outlines America’s ambition to become strong, sovereign, self-sufficient, and thoroughly uninterested in other people’s business unless it happens to be profitable or strategically irresistible. One can imagine Washington waking up one morning, looking in the mirror, and gasping, “My God, I’ve let myself go. I need to rebuild my industrial capacity, tighten my supply-chain core, and stop letting foreigners into my economic bloodstream.”

Thus begins America’s new fitness programme.

In this gym routine, immigration is not cardio—it is cholesterol. Migration inflows are rebranded as clogged arteries of civilisation, requiring immediate intervention through border walls, patrol drones, and a national diet free of humanitarian impulses. The NSS avoids saying this explicitly, but one can sense the subtext: “We’re not racist; we’re just allergic to demographic uncertainty.”

Strength, of course, includes military might—the sort of might that reminds the world that while America may no longer wish to be Atlas, it fully intends to continue owning Atlas-branded weapons systems. The strategy promises the most advanced missiles, space capabilities, cyber arsenals, quantum networks, hypersonic toys, and nuclear deterrents that would make even Zeus consider early retirement. 

Self-reliance completes the fitness triad. America will now produce its own semiconductors, refine its own rare earths, pump its own oil, mine its own coal, and build its own back-up supply chains in case China sneezes in the general direction of a microchip. Renewable energy is gently escorted to the waiting room while oil, gas, and coal are called back into the CEO’s office for a performance review that ends with: “Congratulations, you're promoted. Again.”

Transactional Diplomacy: Friendships With Receipts

If the old American order was a sentimental sitcom about global cooperation, the NSS 2025 rewrites foreign policy as a no-nonsense business school case study. In this new arrangement, the U.S. sees itself not as “leader of the free world” but as “CEO of America Incorporated,” and alliances are treated less like marriages and more like subscription services. Washington will now re-evaluate whether NATO, the Quad, and various bilateral commitments offer sufficient return on investment. A partner unwilling to pay 2 percent of its GDP on defence is no longer an ally—it is an expense.

This managerial diplomacy is refreshingly honest. Gone is the romantic drivel about shared values, human dignity, or multilateral harmony. Instead, the world is gently informed that every diplomatic engagement comes with terms and conditions, cancellation penalties, and a renewed emphasis on “reciprocity,” which is diplomatic code for “Do what we want, or we will charge you tariffs and call it national security.”

The NSS also embraces the close cooperation of government and private industry, a phrase that historically means “lobbyists have entered the chat.” Tech giants, defence contractors, biotech firms, and space innovators will now form an unofficial politburo that decides national priorities. Human rights may get a polite nod at conferences, but AI supremacy gets the budget.

Realism as Ideology: The New Sermon on the Mount

It is amusing how the NSS claims to reject “ideology” while passionately embracing the ideology of “pragmatic realism.” This is similar to a person saying they are done with dating drama but immediately joining six dating apps because “this time it’s different.”

The NSS insists America will no longer intervene in foreign nations unless directly threatened, which sounds admirably restrained until one reads the next two paragraphs detailing how the U.S. will actively mediate the Ukraine-Russia conflict, steer Iranian-Israeli de-escalation, monitor the India-Pakistan nuclear shadow, and stabilise African flashpoints. This is not restraint; it is multitasking.

America also asserts it will avoid nation-building, which is technically true—because why build when one can influence, advise, recalibrate, adjust, pressure, or gently threaten within a rules-based-don’t-ask-who-made-the-rules order?

The guiding principle is “peace through overwhelming strength,” a phrase best understood as “peace, but with more aircraft carriers.” 

Europe: A Continent Scolded Into Responsibility

The NSS’s European chapter reads like a passive-aggressive letter written by a disappointed parent to a child who refuses to stop eating sugar. Europe is told its immigration policies are naïve, its political integration misguided, its defence spending inadequate, and its strategic autonomy delusional.

At the same time, Washington still expects European nations to fund Ukraine’s recovery, deter Russia, modernise their armies, reduce dependency on Moscow and Beijing, resist populism unless it is the American-approved variety, and maintain unity despite being constantly criticised for lacking backbone.

The document delicately suggests that Europe should “negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine,” a polite way of saying, “We tried sanctions, aid, weapons, and diplomacy—but now we’d like a break. You handle it.”

Europe, in response, appears to be nodding politely while slowly backing out of the room.

The Indo-Pacific: Where the Real Drama Continues

The Indo-Pacific remains the stage where America projects its favourite narrative: “China is rising, and we are not amused.” The NSS devotes enormous energy to explaining how Washington will out-compete Beijing through alliances, decoupling, tech restrictions, military presence, and rules-based assertiveness.

India receives special attention as a “pivotal partner,” which is Washington code for, “We need you to annoy China but please don’t ask us to stop Pakistan from harassing you.” The U.S. flatters India’s strategic autonomy while silently wishing India would become slightly less autonomous and slightly more predictable in supporting American interests.

Japan and Australia are reassured that the U.S. will stand by them—provided they maintain high military readiness, consistent defence budgets, and a readiness to intercept undesirable Chinese behaviour in waterways that the NSS likes to call “international waters” and China likes to call “ours.”

The Western Hemisphere: The Monroe Doctrine Rises From the Dead

You can almost hear the ghost of James Monroe chuckling with delight as the NSS declares that America will once again treat its hemisphere as a neighbourhood that requires strict supervision. Migration is elevated from a social challenge to an existential threat. Drug cartels are portrayed as hydra-headed monsters that can only be tamed by more surveillance, more indiscriminate interdiction, and occasionally, more helpful reminders that sovereignty is flexible when America feels strongly enough about something.

Canada is politely informed that while it remains a dear friend, it must not let its domestic politics interfere with America’s need for secure supply chains, oil pipelines, and a general sense of northern order.

Latin America, meanwhile, is invited to join U.S.-led energy and trade partnerships—but only after agreeing not to flirt with China, Russia, or anything that looks remotely like socialism.

The Middle East: From Grand Vision to Minimalist Decor

The Middle East section of the NSS reads like a landlord who has decided to stop renovating the property and focus only on essential repairs. Gone are the days of democracy promotion, long-term commitments, and regime-change fantasies. Washington now prefers a minimalist approach: limited counterterrorism assistance, steady energy flows, crisis management on a need-to-intervene basis, and the occasional drone strike when absolutely necessary.

This new approach gives the impression that America is Marie Kondo-ing the Middle East. If a conflict does not “spark joy,” it is politely folded and placed on a shelf until further notice.

Israel and Iran are asked to tone down their enthusiasm for mutual destruction because America is tired and needs a nap.

Africa: The Art of Extracting Without Offending (Too Much)

The NSS expresses deep affection for Africa’s minerals. The continent’s people, politics, and developmental needs are acknowledged in the document with the same emotional investment one might give to a neighbour’s cat—pleased it exists, not overly concerned about its internal issues.

Washington promises partnerships based on trade and supply-chain resilience, which sounds generous until one realises it means “We would like your cobalt and lithium, please, and we would prefer that China and Russia do not get them first.”

Development aid is politely trimmed. Democracy promotion is queued for later review. Security cooperation is limited unless vital minerals are threatened or China builds another infrastructure project without consulting Washington.

Strategic Paradoxes: America Wants Everything at Once

One of the greatest joys of reading the NSS 2025 is observing its internal contradictions performing gymnastics. America wants to reduce global commitments while increasing global influence. It wants partners who are independent but obedient. It wants to protect global trade while using tariffs as weapons. It wants to avoid wars while building the sharpest set of military teeth in human history.

This is not strategy—it is ambitious multitasking. It is the foreign-policy equivalent of wanting to lose weight while eating cake, get eight hours of sleep while staying up watching geopolitical TikToks, and maintain global dominance while pretending not to want it.

Analysts Respond: Equal Parts Panic and Popcorn

Scholars are alarmed by the NSS’s cultural rhetoric and fear it resembles a global TED Talk delivered by a nationalist interior minister. Economists worry that protectionism will lead to retaliation and disrupted supply chains. European leaders sigh, realising they must now choose between raising defence budgets or listening to American lectures for another decade. Human-rights activists are distraught that the U.S. has demoted moral leadership to an optional add-on.

Meanwhile, realists smile with satisfaction. To them, the NSS is merely America finally getting a haircut and admitting that idealism was always just a convincing wig.

Consequences: A More Fragmented World and a More Honest America

The NSS 2025 may accelerate the shift toward a multipolar world where every nation looks out for itself. Climate cooperation may slow down because America has chosen oil and coal as nostalgic comfort foods. Human rights may lose the only heavyweight champion who claimed to care. Tech blocs may harden into Cold War 2.0. Arms races may resume with renewed vigour. Allies may drift into strategic autonomy or strategic confusion.

Yet in all this, one must admit: the NSS is brutally honest. America is tired. America is anxious. America is self-interested. America is no longer pretending otherwise.

Conclusion: Hypocrisy Unmasked—But Not Removed

Has America confessed its Big Power hypocrisy? Yes, in its way. It has peeled off the glitter, the slogans, and the speeches about world citizenship. But it has not renounced power. It has simply updated its branding.

The global village utopia is retired; the fortress has been renovated; the sermon has been replaced with a service contract; and the world is politely invited to adapt.

America is not stepping down from global leadership. It is merely changing job description—from “guardian of humanity” to “manager of selective global influence.” And the NSS 2025 is its comically elaborate cover letter. 

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Putin's December 2025 Visit to India: Geopolitical Ripples and the Trajectory of Indo-Russian Relations

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Russian President Vladimir Putin’s December visit to India unfolded amid rising global tensions and sharp Western criticism. Days before his arrival, the British, German, and French ambassadors published a blistering op-ed in India calling him a “war criminal” and attacking Russia’s “unprovoked” invasion of Ukraine—an unusual diplomatic move that underscored the West’s urgency to isolate Moscow. Yet India welcomed Putin with full honours, held a joint press conference, and signed more than a dozen agreements. These included an Economic Cooperation Programme till 2030 to raise bilateral trade from $68 billion in 2024 to $100 billion, commitments of uninterrupted fuel supplies despite U.S. sanctions, defence upgrades to Su-30MKI jets and BrahMos systems, and progress on the INSTC to cut freight times by 40%. The visit reflected a pragmatic, interest-driven partnership.

Outcomes and Impacts on Key Stakeholders

India-Russia Stakes in the Indian Ocean

India and Russia share an important but often understated stake in the Indian Ocean, where their post-Putin-visit cooperation is likely to expand. For India, the region is its maritime backyard and the key to security, stability, and strategic autonomy. It is vital for trade and energy flows, and for countering China’s growing naval presence, strengthened by the “String of Pearls” network of ports and facilities such as Gwadar, Hambantota, and Djibouti. These developments have intensified India’s need for reliable partners for naval modernisation and for maintaining a multipolar balance without excessive dependence on the West. For Russia, the Indian Ocean offers coveted access to warm waters and a way to sustain global relevance at a time when Europe has largely shut its doors. Moscow seeks a bigger role in Indo-Pacific energy routes, port logistics, and defence-industrial linkages. A stronger presence in the region—through joint naval exercises, technology collaboration, and potential logistics agreements with India—helps Russia maintain visibility and influence despite Western isolation.

Europe: Undermining Sanctions and Exposing Divisions

For Europe, the summit was a sobering reminder of the limits of its Russia-containment strategy. Still grappling with energy shocks triggered by the Ukraine war, European governments have tightened sanctions to cripple Moscow’s war effort. Yet India’s growing dependence on discounted Russian oil—nearly 40% of its crude imports in 2025—has weakened these measures. Putin’s assurance of steady supplies, along with ongoing discussions on new reactors at Kudankulam, signals deeper Indo-Russian energy ties and further reduces Europe’s leverage.

Economically, the $100 billion trade target risks diverting Indian interest away from European green-tech partnerships, as Moscow offers cheaper options in fertilisers, energy, and defence spares. Geopolitically, the visit strengthens Russia’s narrative of a rising multipolar order, encouraging other Global South states to skirt Western sanctions. Europe may respond with tighter scrutiny of Indian firms involved in transshipping Russian goods, potentially complicating EU–India free-trade talks. Meanwhile, Putin’s remark that Russia is “ready for war if Europe initiates one” serves as a thinly veiled warning against escalation. Overall, the visit pushes Europe toward greater reliance on U.S. LNG—while straining ties with an increasingly assertive India.

United States: A Cold Shower Amid Trump 2.0

Washington has long seen the Indo-Russian partnership as a hurdle to its Indo-Pacific strategy and has repeatedly urged India to cut its dependence on Russian arms and oil. But the visit signalled clearly that India will not act as a junior partner in any U.S. plan to contain Russia or China. New defence co-production efforts—particularly the expanded joint manufacturing of BrahMos systems—also challenge America’s dominance in India’s $75-billion defence modernisation programme. The summit is unlikely to please Washington because it highlights India’s desire to hedge against U.S. unpredictability. With India running a $30-billion trade surplus, Trump’s proposed 60% tariffs could become real, adding further strain. Yet the U.S. still needs India as a key QUAD partner against China, and pushing too hard risks driving Delhi closer to Moscow or even Beijing. The irony is that while U.S. outreach to Russia has made no progress on Ukraine, India positions itself as a neutral player. Washington may now speed up the iCET tech plan, but likely at higher costs, even as India’s INSTC push builds sanction-resistant Eurasian routes that dilute U.S. pressure tools.

Pakistan: Heightened Insecurities and Regional Disequilibrium

Moscow’s renewed defence focus on India—through Su-30 upgrades, air-defence cooperation, and expanded joint production—further tilts the regional military balance against Islamabad. Although Russia briefly courted Pakistan after 2014 with limited sales like Mi-35 helicopters, the 2025 agreements firmly prioritise Delhi and may embolden India’s counter-terrorism posture along the Line of Control.

Geopolitically, the visit deepens Pakistan’s isolation. India’s integration into the INSTC, routed via Iran, bypasses Pakistan and undercuts Gwadar’s strategic value under CPEC, reducing even China’s leverage. With FATF pressure and a battered economy, Islamabad may seek renewed U.S. engagement for F-16 support, though Trump’s “America First” stance may limit assistance. The Indo-Russian anti-terror pledge, implicitly naming groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, further strains Russia-Pakistan ties and raises the risk of sharper Indo-Pak friction under a volatile nuclear backdrop.

China: A Balancing Act in the Dragon-Bear-Tiger Triangle

China's response is nuanced, blending wariness with strategic calculus. As Russia's "no-limits" partner, Beijing benefits from Moscow's pivot to Asia, but India's warming ties threaten Sino-Russian exclusivity. The summit reviews the "full spectrum" partnership, including space and nuclear tech, positioning India as a counterweight to Chinese dominance in the Indian Ocean. BrahMos expansions enhance India's maritime deterrence, a direct hedge against China’s incursions in the South China Sea and LAC standoffs.

The $100 billion trade goal diversifies India's basket beyond Chinese imports, but Russian mediation could facilitate India-China détente. Putin's visit, defying Western isolation, mirrors Xi's Global South outreach, strengthening BRICS cohesion. Beijing may also take steps to deepen SCO engagements, but the INSTC—which rivals BRI—fragments Eurasian integration, forcing China to concede ground. Overall, it fosters a tripod dynamic: Russia balances the duo, preventing outright rivalry while amplifying collective heft against the West.

India: Empowerment Amid Autonomy

For India, the windfall is tangible. Energy security is fortified against volatile Brent prices, with Russian supplies ensuring GDP growth buffers. Defense self-reliance advances via localised BrahMos production, reducing import dependencies from 60% to under 40% by 2030. Trade diversification—from commodities to hi-tech—cushions against U.S. tariffs, while people-to-people ties, including 25th-anniversary cultural exchanges, bolster soft power. India’s "powerful global message" of non-alignment resonates domestically, elevating India's G20 presidency legacy.

Broader Geopolitical Reconfigurations

Globally, the summit accelerates multipolarity. It validates the Global South's sanction fatigue, with BRICS expansion gaining momentum for de-dollarisation via rupee-ruble settlements. Ukraine's shadow looms: Putin's "victory" claims, aired during the visit, underscore stalled talks, positioning India as a peace convener. This erodes U.S.-led unipolarity, fostering Eurasian corridors that link Mumbai to Murmansk, diluting Western naval primacy. Climate diplomacy intersects too—Russian Arctic routes aid India's green shipping goals. Risks include escalation if U.S. secondary sanctions bite, but upsides dominate: A more equitable order where middle powers like India dictate terms.

Forward Trajectory of Indo-Russian Relations

Defense: From Buyer to Co-Creator

Post-summit, defense cooperation will evolve from transactional to transformative. The Su-30MKI overhaul, valued at $4 billion, includes indigenous avionics integration, aiming for 70% local content by 2028. BrahMos NG (Next Generation) joint ventures will export to Southeast Asia, generating $2 billion revenues. Air defense pacts, potentially S-500 tech transfers, fortify India's layered shields against hypersonic threats. By 2030, co-development of sixth-gen fighters could materialise, blending Russian stealth with Indian AI, which will  make F-35 superfluous for the Indian Air Force. Maritime focus also intensifies: Akula submarine leases extend, with indigenous Scorpene variants incorporating Russian quieting tech. This "Make in India" synergy not only bolsters deterrence but positions both as arms exporters, challenging Western monopolies.

Education: Bridging Minds Across Continents

Education, often overlooked, will see exponential growth. The 25-year partnership milestone spurred 500 new scholarships for Indian students in Russian STEM programs, focusing on AI and nuclear engineering. Exchanges via Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund will double to 1,000 annually, emphasising Eurasian studies to counter Western narratives. Virtual platforms, like Rosatom-IGNOU collaborations, democratise access to Arctic research. Rosatom  is Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy corporation, responsible for nuclear power plants, nuclear weapons complex, uranium mining, fuel cycle operations, and nuclear exports. Some Russian universities run nuclear-related programmes in partnership with Rosatom. So, in the long term, this fosters a cadre of bilingual experts, underpinning hi-tech ties and soft power.

Trade: Diversification Beyond Discounts

In order to achieve their trade's $100 billion benchmark, diversification is essential. While energy dominates with 60% of volumes, the 2030 Programme targets manufacturing which would involve Russian fertilisers for Indian agri-exports and Indian pharma to Eurasian markets. Rupee-ruble mechanisms will settle 50% of deals, shielding against SWIFT exclusions. Investments are expected to surge. The energy giant Rosneft's $15 billion Sakhalin infusion meets India's $20 billion in Siberian infra. E-commerce bridges via Yandex-Flipkart tie-ups, while INSTC logistics cut costs, enabling just-in-time supply chains. By 2030, balanced flows—$50 billion each way—will embed resilience against global shocks.

Hi-Tech Cooperation: Fusion of Frontiers

Hi-tech cooperation between India and Russia spans multiple sectors and is evolving beyond traditional defense ties. In space, the two sides are working toward GLONASS–NavIC satellite navigational systems’ interoperability, which would give India more independence from the Chinese Beidou navigation system and give India a reliable navigation network. There are also plans for expanded lunar collaboration later in the decade. In nuclear energy, work at Kudankulam Units 3–6 continues with Russian assistance. Emerging fields such as AI and quantum communications feature collaborations between Rosatom’s research institutes and Indian partners like IITs, focusing on secure networks and advanced materials. Joint biotech projects aim to strengthen pandemic-response capabilities. Civil aviation cooperation—such as discussions on assembling Russia’s MC-21 aircraft in India—adds a competitive dimension to the sector. According to the joint statement, this wide-ranging technological partnership supports “socioeconomic and technological advancement” and includes dual-use innovations such as drone fleets suited for disaster management. Ethical safeguards, including agreements on data sovereignty and responsible technology use, are meant to build long-term trust.

Conclusion

Putin's December 2025 India visit was a geopolitical masterstroke, yielding outcomes that ripple far beyond bilateral gains. Europe and the U.S. confront sanction circumvention and alliance strains; Pakistan grapples with disequilibrium; China navigates a rivalrous equilibrium; and India emerges empowered. Globally, it heralds multipolarity's dawn, where strategic autonomy trumps coercion. Looking ahead, Indo-Russian ties will deepen asymmetrically—defense for security, education for intellect, trade for prosperity, hi-tech for innovation—forging a resilient axis in an unpredictable era. Clearly, Putin’s visit to India signals the dawn of a less unipolar and more equitable world. 

Russia, India, Putin, GLONASS–NavIC, Rosatom, IITs, Civil Aviation, Beidou navigation system, Rosneft, Siberian infra, STEM programs, Su-30MKI, defence deals, INSTC, BRI, CPEC. Pakistan, Nuclear Reactors, Kudankulam, Green Tech, Scorpene Submarines, Akula, LAC, Terrorism, Brahmos