Putin's December 2025 Visit to India: Geopolitical Ripples and the Trajectory of Indo-Russian Relations

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Russian President Vladimir Putin’s December visit to India unfolded amid rising global tensions and sharp Western criticism. Days before his arrival, the British, German, and French ambassadors published a blistering op-ed in India calling him a “war criminal” and attacking Russia’s “unprovoked” invasion of Ukraine—an unusual diplomatic move that underscored the West’s urgency to isolate Moscow. Yet India welcomed Putin with full honours, held a joint press conference, and signed more than a dozen agreements. These included an Economic Cooperation Programme till 2030 to raise bilateral trade from $68 billion in 2024 to $100 billion, commitments of uninterrupted fuel supplies despite U.S. sanctions, defence upgrades to Su-30MKI jets and BrahMos systems, and progress on the INSTC to cut freight times by 40%. The visit reflected a pragmatic, interest-driven partnership.

Outcomes and Impacts on Key Stakeholders

India-Russia Stakes in the Indian Ocean

India and Russia share an important but often understated stake in the Indian Ocean, where their post-Putin-visit cooperation is likely to expand. For India, the region is its maritime backyard and the key to security, stability, and strategic autonomy. It is vital for trade and energy flows, and for countering China’s growing naval presence, strengthened by the “String of Pearls” network of ports and facilities such as Gwadar, Hambantota, and Djibouti. These developments have intensified India’s need for reliable partners for naval modernisation and for maintaining a multipolar balance without excessive dependence on the West. For Russia, the Indian Ocean offers coveted access to warm waters and a way to sustain global relevance at a time when Europe has largely shut its doors. Moscow seeks a bigger role in Indo-Pacific energy routes, port logistics, and defence-industrial linkages. A stronger presence in the region—through joint naval exercises, technology collaboration, and potential logistics agreements with India—helps Russia maintain visibility and influence despite Western isolation.

Europe: Undermining Sanctions and Exposing Divisions

For Europe, the summit was a sobering reminder of the limits of its Russia-containment strategy. Still grappling with energy shocks triggered by the Ukraine war, European governments have tightened sanctions to cripple Moscow’s war effort. Yet India’s growing dependence on discounted Russian oil—nearly 40% of its crude imports in 2025—has weakened these measures. Putin’s assurance of steady supplies, along with ongoing discussions on new reactors at Kudankulam, signals deeper Indo-Russian energy ties and further reduces Europe’s leverage.

Economically, the $100 billion trade target risks diverting Indian interest away from European green-tech partnerships, as Moscow offers cheaper options in fertilisers, energy, and defence spares. Geopolitically, the visit strengthens Russia’s narrative of a rising multipolar order, encouraging other Global South states to skirt Western sanctions. Europe may respond with tighter scrutiny of Indian firms involved in transshipping Russian goods, potentially complicating EU–India free-trade talks. Meanwhile, Putin’s remark that Russia is “ready for war if Europe initiates one” serves as a thinly veiled warning against escalation. Overall, the visit pushes Europe toward greater reliance on U.S. LNG—while straining ties with an increasingly assertive India.

United States: A Cold Shower Amid Trump 2.0

Washington has long seen the Indo-Russian partnership as a hurdle to its Indo-Pacific strategy and has repeatedly urged India to cut its dependence on Russian arms and oil. But the visit signalled clearly that India will not act as a junior partner in any U.S. plan to contain Russia or China. New defence co-production efforts—particularly the expanded joint manufacturing of BrahMos systems—also challenge America’s dominance in India’s $75-billion defence modernisation programme. The summit is unlikely to please Washington because it highlights India’s desire to hedge against U.S. unpredictability. With India running a $30-billion trade surplus, Trump’s proposed 60% tariffs could become real, adding further strain. Yet the U.S. still needs India as a key QUAD partner against China, and pushing too hard risks driving Delhi closer to Moscow or even Beijing. The irony is that while U.S. outreach to Russia has made no progress on Ukraine, India positions itself as a neutral player. Washington may now speed up the iCET tech plan, but likely at higher costs, even as India’s INSTC push builds sanction-resistant Eurasian routes that dilute U.S. pressure tools.

Pakistan: Heightened Insecurities and Regional Disequilibrium

Moscow’s renewed defence focus on India—through Su-30 upgrades, air-defence cooperation, and expanded joint production—further tilts the regional military balance against Islamabad. Although Russia briefly courted Pakistan after 2014 with limited sales like Mi-35 helicopters, the 2025 agreements firmly prioritise Delhi and may embolden India’s counter-terrorism posture along the Line of Control.

Geopolitically, the visit deepens Pakistan’s isolation. India’s integration into the INSTC, routed via Iran, bypasses Pakistan and undercuts Gwadar’s strategic value under CPEC, reducing even China’s leverage. With FATF pressure and a battered economy, Islamabad may seek renewed U.S. engagement for F-16 support, though Trump’s “America First” stance may limit assistance. The Indo-Russian anti-terror pledge, implicitly naming groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, further strains Russia-Pakistan ties and raises the risk of sharper Indo-Pak friction under a volatile nuclear backdrop.

China: A Balancing Act in the Dragon-Bear-Tiger Triangle

China's response is nuanced, blending wariness with strategic calculus. As Russia's "no-limits" partner, Beijing benefits from Moscow's pivot to Asia, but India's warming ties threaten Sino-Russian exclusivity. The summit reviews the "full spectrum" partnership, including space and nuclear tech, positioning India as a counterweight to Chinese dominance in the Indian Ocean. BrahMos expansions enhance India's maritime deterrence, a direct hedge against China’s incursions in the South China Sea and LAC standoffs.

The $100 billion trade goal diversifies India's basket beyond Chinese imports, but Russian mediation could facilitate India-China détente. Putin's visit, defying Western isolation, mirrors Xi's Global South outreach, strengthening BRICS cohesion. Beijing may also take steps to deepen SCO engagements, but the INSTC—which rivals BRI—fragments Eurasian integration, forcing China to concede ground. Overall, it fosters a tripod dynamic: Russia balances the duo, preventing outright rivalry while amplifying collective heft against the West.

India: Empowerment Amid Autonomy

For India, the windfall is tangible. Energy security is fortified against volatile Brent prices, with Russian supplies ensuring GDP growth buffers. Defense self-reliance advances via localised BrahMos production, reducing import dependencies from 60% to under 40% by 2030. Trade diversification—from commodities to hi-tech—cushions against U.S. tariffs, while people-to-people ties, including 25th-anniversary cultural exchanges, bolster soft power. India’s "powerful global message" of non-alignment resonates domestically, elevating India's G20 presidency legacy.

Broader Geopolitical Reconfigurations

Globally, the summit accelerates multipolarity. It validates the Global South's sanction fatigue, with BRICS expansion gaining momentum for de-dollarisation via rupee-ruble settlements. Ukraine's shadow looms: Putin's "victory" claims, aired during the visit, underscore stalled talks, positioning India as a peace convener. This erodes U.S.-led unipolarity, fostering Eurasian corridors that link Mumbai to Murmansk, diluting Western naval primacy. Climate diplomacy intersects too—Russian Arctic routes aid India's green shipping goals. Risks include escalation if U.S. secondary sanctions bite, but upsides dominate: A more equitable order where middle powers like India dictate terms.

Forward Trajectory of Indo-Russian Relations

Defense: From Buyer to Co-Creator

Post-summit, defense cooperation will evolve from transactional to transformative. The Su-30MKI overhaul, valued at $4 billion, includes indigenous avionics integration, aiming for 70% local content by 2028. BrahMos NG (Next Generation) joint ventures will export to Southeast Asia, generating $2 billion revenues. Air defense pacts, potentially S-500 tech transfers, fortify India's layered shields against hypersonic threats. By 2030, co-development of sixth-gen fighters could materialise, blending Russian stealth with Indian AI, which will  make F-35 superfluous for the Indian Air Force. Maritime focus also intensifies: Akula submarine leases extend, with indigenous Scorpene variants incorporating Russian quieting tech. This "Make in India" synergy not only bolsters deterrence but positions both as arms exporters, challenging Western monopolies.

Education: Bridging Minds Across Continents

Education, often overlooked, will see exponential growth. The 25-year partnership milestone spurred 500 new scholarships for Indian students in Russian STEM programs, focusing on AI and nuclear engineering. Exchanges via Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund will double to 1,000 annually, emphasising Eurasian studies to counter Western narratives. Virtual platforms, like Rosatom-IGNOU collaborations, democratise access to Arctic research. Rosatom  is Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy corporation, responsible for nuclear power plants, nuclear weapons complex, uranium mining, fuel cycle operations, and nuclear exports. Some Russian universities run nuclear-related programmes in partnership with Rosatom. So, in the long term, this fosters a cadre of bilingual experts, underpinning hi-tech ties and soft power.

Trade: Diversification Beyond Discounts

In order to achieve their trade's $100 billion benchmark, diversification is essential. While energy dominates with 60% of volumes, the 2030 Programme targets manufacturing which would involve Russian fertilisers for Indian agri-exports and Indian pharma to Eurasian markets. Rupee-ruble mechanisms will settle 50% of deals, shielding against SWIFT exclusions. Investments are expected to surge. The energy giant Rosneft's $15 billion Sakhalin infusion meets India's $20 billion in Siberian infra. E-commerce bridges via Yandex-Flipkart tie-ups, while INSTC logistics cut costs, enabling just-in-time supply chains. By 2030, balanced flows—$50 billion each way—will embed resilience against global shocks.

Hi-Tech Cooperation: Fusion of Frontiers

Hi-tech cooperation between India and Russia spans multiple sectors and is evolving beyond traditional defense ties. In space, the two sides are working toward GLONASS–NavIC satellite navigational systems’ interoperability, which would give India more independence from the Chinese Beidou navigation system and give India a reliable navigation network. There are also plans for expanded lunar collaboration later in the decade. In nuclear energy, work at Kudankulam Units 3–6 continues with Russian assistance. Emerging fields such as AI and quantum communications feature collaborations between Rosatom’s research institutes and Indian partners like IITs, focusing on secure networks and advanced materials. Joint biotech projects aim to strengthen pandemic-response capabilities. Civil aviation cooperation—such as discussions on assembling Russia’s MC-21 aircraft in India—adds a competitive dimension to the sector. According to the joint statement, this wide-ranging technological partnership supports “socioeconomic and technological advancement” and includes dual-use innovations such as drone fleets suited for disaster management. Ethical safeguards, including agreements on data sovereignty and responsible technology use, are meant to build long-term trust.

Conclusion

Putin's December 2025 India visit was a geopolitical masterstroke, yielding outcomes that ripple far beyond bilateral gains. Europe and the U.S. confront sanction circumvention and alliance strains; Pakistan grapples with disequilibrium; China navigates a rivalrous equilibrium; and India emerges empowered. Globally, it heralds multipolarity's dawn, where strategic autonomy trumps coercion. Looking ahead, Indo-Russian ties will deepen asymmetrically—defense for security, education for intellect, trade for prosperity, hi-tech for innovation—forging a resilient axis in an unpredictable era. Clearly, Putin’s visit to India signals the dawn of a less unipolar and more equitable world. 

Russia, India, Putin, GLONASS–NavIC, Rosatom, IITs, Civil Aviation, Beidou navigation system, Rosneft, Siberian infra, STEM programs, Su-30MKI, defence deals, INSTC, BRI, CPEC. Pakistan, Nuclear Reactors, Kudankulam, Green Tech, Scorpene Submarines, Akula, LAC, Terrorism, Brahmos

When the Rupee Trembles: What India’s Currency Slide and IMF ‘C’ Grade Really Tell Us

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Is India’s economy groaning under heavy debt burden? Is the falling rupee an indicator of a worrisome economic situation? Is there no improvement in the country’s unemployment situation? The answers are quite surprising. 

Every once in a while, a single economic headline sends a tremor through public discourse. Over the past few days, that headline has been the Indian Rupee’s sudden slide toward—and, in some speculative corners, beyond—the psychologically daunting level of 100 against the U.S. Dollar, which has not happened as yet. But the very fact that people believe it will crash to triple digits tells us that confidence is wobbling.

The other headline that grabbed attention—a less glamorous but equally consequential one—came from Washington. The IMF’s Article IV report for 2025 assigned India a ‘C’ grade for the quality of its national accounts, the second-lowest rating on its A-to-D scale. Overnight, social media declared that India’s GDP figures were “fake,” that the growth story was over, and that “Viksit Bharat by 2047” was nothing more than a political fairy tale.

Both reactions—panic over the rupee, outrage over the grade—are emotionally understandable. But they miss the larger, complex reality. India’s economic narrative in late 2025 is not one of collapse or free fall. It is a story of strong domestic momentum mixed with external vulnerabilities, a story where data quality needs scrutiny, not cynicism, and where a currency slump is less an omen of doom than a reminder of how deeply India is now entangled in the volatile geopolitics of global trade.

Nevertheless, it does matter that the rupee has crossed the 90 mark. Because exchange rates are often as psychological as they are economic. Crossing 90 sends a signal—whether valid or not—that something is out of balance.

Why Is the Rupee Falling? A Reality Check

The rupee’s 4–5% depreciation this year stems mainly from external pressures rather than internal weakness. Aggressive U.S. tariffs, which have pushed effective rates on some Indian exports to nearly 38%, have hurt competitiveness. Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPIs) have withdrawn around $10 billion since mid-year, adding volatility. Meanwhile, a widening trade deficit driven by costlier imports and weak merchandise exports has increased external stress. With U.S. interest rates still high, global investors are fleeing to safer assets, putting further downward pressure on emerging-market currencies, including the rupee, which has become one of Asia’s weaker performers in 2025.

However, the Indian Rupee (INR) has shown mixed performance against major Asian currencies in early December 2025, with general depreciation trends against the Japanese Yen (JPY), South Korean Won (KRW), and Singapore Dollar (SGD), while fluctuating slightly against the Chinese Yuan (CNY). The chart illustrates the percentage change in exchange rates (INR per unit of foreign currency) from December 1, 2025, as the baseline. A positive percentage indicates INR depreciation (weaker INR), while negative shows appreciation (stronger INR).

Is This a Crisis? No. Not Even Close.

With around $695 billion in forex, India’s robust reserves offer extensive protection from external problems. As of December 2025, India’s outstanding World Bank debt (IBRD + IDA) is about USD 39.3 billion, based on data available up to October 2025, and no major updates have altered this figure since. This is only around 5% of India’s total external debt of roughly USD 747 billion (June 2025), a modest share for the Bank’s largest borrower and one mainly used for long-term infrastructure, social, and development projects. India’s external debt-to-GDP ratio stands at about 19%, well below the 30% level usually considered risky for emerging markets, and World Bank loans amount to less than 1% of India’s projected USD 4.19 trillion GDP in 2025. With more than ten months of import cover in forex reserves and a resilient financial system highlighted in the IMF’s November 2025 review, India’s debt profile remains stable. World Bank lending is also largely concessional, lowering repayment burdens. Overall, India’s borrowing aligns with its development goals and remains comfortably sustainable, though global shocks or slower growth would warrant routine monitoring.

External debt is manageable at around 19% of GDP, which is a stronger position than most emerging economies with tighter financing issues. Strong foreign investment continues, reaching almost $44 billion in the initial five months of FY25/26, reflecting investor trust in India’s future. These strengths demonstrate the rupee’s decline is a test, not an upcoming crisis. India’s situation is not unique or alarming, as many currencies are weakening against the dollar during global tightening, and countries like Japan, South Korea, and Indonesia face similar issues. However, ignoring the depreciation entirely would be unwise, as a weaker rupee raises the prices of essential imports like oil, fertilisers, electronics, and industrial inputs—items India can’t easily replace. A slight depreciation usually increases inflation by about 0.2–0.3% in the coming quarters. The real issue is if India can handle these increasing outside pressures with its internal strengths.

The alarmist statements on India’s total debt burden are also unfounded. Based on the latest 2025 projections from sources like the IMF and other economic databases, India's general government gross debt stands at approximately 81% of GDP. This places it in the moderate range—higher than some emerging markets like Russia (15%) or Saudi Arabia (30%) but significantly lower than advanced economies like Japan (255%), Italy (135%), the United States (122%), and France (111%).

The IMF’s ‘C’ Grade: A Reality Check, Not a Final Verdict

India’s national accounts statistics received a ‘C’ grade from the IMF, which caused strong political reactions; critics accused data manipulation, and supporters saw the report as Western bias. Both sides are missing the mark. The IMF’s evaluation cites methodological flaws, not fraud. It has three main concerns: poor measurement of India’s informal sector, which employs almost 90% of its workers; Crucially, this grade applies only to a specific segment of India’s statistical system, not the entire framework. India’s data rating is ‘B,’ suggesting data is mostly reliable for economic analysis and policy, despite room for improvement.

Does This Mean India’s Growth Is Overstated?

According to the IMF, India’s growth numbers may be overstated by about 0.5 to 1%, but even after trimming the excess, India still outruns every other major economy. In other words, the debate is more about optics than outcomes. And the private-sector data boosts optimism. The Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) has been sitting comfortably above 59, signalling factories that are very much alive. Record-high e-way bill generation—the digital permits required for moving goods across states—shows trucks and warehouses are active. Additionally, 21 million new jobs in the year to September, reflects the economy’s health. The IMF isn’t saying the growth is fake; it’s simply pointing out that India’s fast-expanding, partly informal economy needs better tools to measure what is actually happening.

India’s Domestic Engine: Strong, Synchronised, and Unusually Well-Balanced

The scope of India’s internal economic growth in 2025 is a key feature. GDP growth was 6.5% in FY2024/25, then accelerated to 7.8% in Q1 FY2025/26; the trend is still strong, despite data concerns. Personal spending increased by over 7%, while investment saw nearly 9% growth, and service exports stayed at a high level. Inflation also reached historic lows, with CPI at 0.25% in October, thanks to GST, harvests, and base effects. Even underlying inflation remained within the RBI’s comfort zone. Indian employment, usually a weak spot, has unexpectedly strengthened, creating about 21 million jobs in the last year in both cities and the countryside. The expansion has also been aided by banking conditions: the RBI’s 100-basis-point rate cuts since February led to increased credit growth, higher retail spending, renewed borrowing by small businesses, and controlled non-performing assets. Strong demand, low inflation, more jobs, and good credit make India different than most large economies. India’s domestic economy is a bright spot in 2025, outperforming China, Brazil, South Africa, the Eurozone, and the United States on multiple key domestic measures.

But certain problems should worry us.

The External Weaknesses: India’s Achilles’ Heel

India is susceptible to global shocks, and the rupee’s fall shows underlying issues. The trade deficit poses the biggest, ongoing problem. The Current Account Deficit, at 0.6% of GDP in FY24/25 and forecast to grow to 1% this year, masks underlying problems: struggling merchandise exports, high oil imports, and rising electronics imports, even with production incentives. If India doesn’t modernise its manufacturing, broaden its supply chains, and get better free trade deals, the rupee will stay susceptible to outside volatility. Another critical area of concern is how foreign portfolio investors act. FPIs see India as a volatile, high-return market, sensitive to global rates, tariffs, and politics. The irregular flow of money causes market instability in stocks and bonds, and this movement affects the currency, making the rupee more reactive to world finance.

A Balanced Scorecard for Late 2025

India’s economic reality is revealed by examining key indicators. Strong growth persists, potentially over 6.5% after revisions, with low inflation providing relief for consumers and the RBI. India is indeed creating more jobs, but too many of them are low-quality—informal, insecure, low-wage, or without benefits—while not enough stable, productive, well-paying jobs are being generated in manufacturing, modern services, and skilled sectors.

Fiscal policy is fairly controlled, and the deficit target is 4.4%. External balances seem steady but are vulnerable, with a rising deficit and rupee issues. Also, India’s large foreign exchange reserves protect against external shocks. The assessment is complicated by poor data quality, especially in the informal sector. In general, this depicts an economy that’s neither failing nor excelling, but a resilient system seeking equilibrium in a volatile world.

The Bigger Picture: What the Rupee and IMF Grade Reveal About India’s Path Ahead

India’s economic issues reveal a truth: it’s big enough to be watched but not strong enough for global instability. This moment is defined by four themes. India’s most pressing need is improved data; start with the census, household surveys, and tools for the informal sector. When data lacks credibility, investors pause, governments misuse funds, and the public’s faith weakens. Next, India has to diversify its trade, since its exports are too exposed to tariffs and geopolitical instability. India’s long-term success also depends on boosting productivity. India’s Total Factor Productivity has grown by around 1.4% yearly since 2000, and must significantly improve for India to achieve high-income status by 2047. India now requires closer alignment between financial and monetary policy. The nation can match fiscal tightening with monetary ease, thanks to low inflation and high growth.

Conclusion: A Moment of Sobriety, Not Panic

India faces a pivotal moment. The rupee’s decline to 90 isn’t a disaster, but a sign of weakness. The IMF’s ‘C’ grade doesn’t condemn, but it should cause us to reflect. The sensational headline about crossing 100 isn’t the real story of the Indian economy in 2025. The deeper story is about a strong internal economy, but vulnerable externally.

India’s rupee will become a small note if it improves statistical capacity, trade resilience, and productivity reforms in the present time. If it doesn’t, today’s worry may become tomorrow’s truth.

India’s economy is still robust, showing great potential, though it needs some adjustments.

IMF, GDP. WORLD BANK, Rupee, Yuan, Dollar, Yen, Ruble, WON, Singapore, South Korea, India, USA, Japan, Exchange Rate, Indian Economy, Growth Rate

Is the American “Empire” Accelerating Its Decline? Lessons from Venezuela’s Oil Standoff and the G20 Snub

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History is full of examples of the rise and fall of great powers and their empires. Roman, Ottoman, Mughal, Britain, and the Soviet Union etc. Now it is America’s turn.

After World War II, the United States became a global hegemon, facilitated by its unmatched military might, economic supremacy, technological edge, and institutional leadership in bodies like the United Nations and Bretton Woods system. This “American empire” shaped international norms, trade, and security. Yet, by late 2025, that edifice appears precarious. This foundation has been undermined by China and India’s growing influence, the Global South’s push for autonomy via forums like BRICS, the U.S. dollar’s decreased dominance, and widespread opposition to U.S. interventions. This is evident in recent events, such as the U.S.-Venezuela oil dispute and the unusual 2025 G20 Summit boycott. Such events mirror previous disagreements, like the U.S.’s 2023 pressure on Nigeria concerning oil theft and currency reforms, where Washington’s coercive methods distanced an African giant and expedited its move toward Chinese financial support. Recent events indicate China capitalising on North American disunity.

The Venezuela Oil Standoff: Coercion Backfiring in a Multipolar World

The Trump administration’s aggressive policy toward Venezuela shows how U.S. unilateralism harms allies while assisting rivals. In February 2025, Trump overturned Biden’s policies by canceling General License 41, which had let Chevron, the final significant U.S. oil company there, extract and sell Venezuelan crude. This triggered a six-month wind-down, cutting Chevron’s joint ventures, which produced around 25% of Venezuela’s output. By March, Trump used a 25% tariff on Venezuelan oil imports to target buyers such as China and India, in order to hurt Caracas’s $20-30 billion annual revenue.

The direct consequences have been striking. Venezuela’s oil output, which had recovered to roughly 1 million bpd in early 2025 due to eased sanctions, is now expected to fall to 800,000 bpd because of supply issues and lack of investment. Because US Gulf Coast refineries were made for Venezuela’s heavy sour crude, they now have a 150,000-200,000 bpd shortfall, causing costly substitutions from Canadian tar sands or Middle Eastern residues, which may increase US gasoline prices by up to $5 per barrel.

But Washington’s loss of power in Latin America is a greater geopolitical setback. Instead of isolating Maduro, these actions hastened Venezuela’s shift toward non-Western nations. China, which has been Venezuela’s biggest lender since 2005 with $60 billion in loans, has increased its investment. In May 2025, China Concord Resources Corp. signed a 20-year production-sharing agreement for two Lake Maracaibo fields. It has invested over $1 billion to increase output from 12,000 to 60,000 bpd by 2026. PDVSA - Venezuela’s state-owned oil and natural gas company - gets lighter crude, but heavier oil goes straight to China, avoiding US tariffs using “shadow fleets” and crypto payments; Maduro uses this to dodge sanctions, laundering about 2 billion dollars yearly via digital assets.

Moreover, Colombia and Brazil are building energy ties with Caracas, forming an “energy autonomy” bloc. Colombian President Gustavo Petro stated in November 2025 that U.S. pressure is about oil, not democracy. Venezuela’s defiance empowers post-dollar vision of the BRICS. Consequently, in long-term this would result in U.S. isolation, with oil possibly traded in yuan or rupees, decreasing the petrodollar’s 40% market share.

The G20 Boycott: A Snub That Exposes U.S. Irrelevance

Compounding the Venezuela debacle, a historic rupture was caused by the U.S. boycott of the November 22-23, 2025, G20 Summit in Johannesburg. The U.S. was unrepresented as Trump banned officials, falsely claiming “genocide” against South African farmers. Trump called the event a “total disgrace”. But the summit went ahead. It finalised a key 122-point agreement. This declaration addressed climate resilience, debt, inequality, and minerals, which Washington had previously blocked. Host Cyril Ramaphosa hailed it as proof the G20’s legitimacy “doesn’t hinge on the U.S.”. China’s Xi Jinping sent Premier Li Qiang, Russia dispatched a deputy due to ICC warrants, and Argentina’s Javier Milei was also absent in support of Trump, but despite this, the 17 leaders present, who together represent 75% of the world’s GDP, reached an agreement.

Trump’s boycott of the summit was denounced as “imperialist meddling with racial bias,” hurting an African-led forum. But it has boosted the Global South’s drive for alternatives like the G77+China bloc. Brazil’s Lula da Silva called the result a “triumph of multilateralism,” and Canadian PM Mark Carney said the world “can move on without the United States.”

As the dollar’s dominance wanes (BRICS nations now trade 28% of oil outside it), and institutions like the G20 evolve without the U.S., unilateralism risks turning America into a “spoiler,” as scholars like Joseph Nye warn—eroding soft power faster than hard power can compensate.

Two Paths Forward: Entrenchment or Adaptation?

More isolation would be risky for the United States. Continued pressure could push Venezuela closer to China and Russia. OPEC expects Venezuela to export 1.2 million barrels of oil per day to Asia by 2030. Latin America may also integrate through groups like Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), reducing U.S. influence. G20 boycotts are creating a form of diplomacy that works without the U.S., while BRICS is moving ahead with plans for a $50 billion development bank by 2027. The dollar is also under pressure: if 20% more oil is traded in other currencies, U.S. Treasury yields could rise by 1–2%, according to Federal Reserve models, worsening America’s $35 trillion debt burden. U.S. allies such as Europe and Japan are already hedging with euro–yuan currency swaps. They could drift further away, leaving Washington looking “volatile and unpopular” and more dependent on military power—much like Britain after the Suez crisis.

However, practical re-engagement may provide recovery. Rejoining multilateralism could temper decline: Diplomacy in Venezuela (e.g., conditional license renewals, as in July 2025) stabilises energy flows; G20 participation rebuilds moral authority. By focusing on alliances such as AUKUS and QUAD and attracting the Global South with debt swaps, the U.S. can become the leader in areas like AI ethics or green tech, where it has a 40% market share. Full hegemony is illusory, but shared influence preserves leverage: A 2025 CSIS report estimates adaptive U.S. policy could retain 70% of current sway by 2035, versus 50% under confrontation.

Global Ripples: Opportunities for the Rest

This junction changes the game for others. India gets strategic advantage from Russian oil ties and the G20, plus Chabahar’s role. African nations, like Nigeria and Ethiopia, have increased influence: Johannesburg’s success confirms AU-G20 partnerships, attracting $500 billion for minerals without US control. Latin America looks to gain sovereignty via PetroCaribe 2.0. The Global South is also advancing “contested multipolarity” with sovereign tech, regional currencies, and forums. The original PetroCaribe was a regional oil deal between Venezuela and Caribbean countries. Hugo Chávez was president when the trade organisation was established in Puerto La Cruz, Venezuela, on June 29, 2005. Venezuela offered oil to member states, with favourable financial terms. PetroCaribe played a role in the Latin American “pink tide,” aiming for post-neoliberal progress.

China-Canada-Mexico Form Anti-US Economic Unity

China, Canada, and Mexico may potentially form an economic alliance against the United States. This will result in deeper shifts in North America’s strategic environment. Such a trio would draw together America’s largest trading partners and its principal global rival, China, to create an unusual coalition that blends geographic proximity with geopolitical intent. Even without a formal treaty, coordination among these three economies could undercut the most important pillars of U.S. economic power: market access, supply-chain dominance, and regional leadership.

China would be the strategic driver. Beijing could use an alliance with Canada and Mexico to bypass the U.S.A.’s control over North American trade. China could lessen its reliance on U.S. markets by collaborating with America’s neighbours, protect itself from Washington’s export controls, and directly influence U.S. supply chains. China’s industrial strategy avoids U.S. constraints, particularly in EVs, batteries, rare earths, and solar. This would be reinforced through greater collaboration with Canada’s minerals and Mexico’s cheap manufacturing.

Canada would be motivated by both economic and political factors. Ottawa and Washington have faced strain due to disagreements over security, tech, and trade. Canada could gain leverage and diversify its market by opening its economy to China and Mexico. Meanwhile, Canada has huge stores of essential minerals like lithium, nickel, and cobalt, which China needs. A joint structure could solidify lasting investment and guarantee demand, while Ottawa keeps its official U.S. links.

Mexico’s strategy is similarly practical. Its economy depends heavily on the U.S., yet it has secretly used China for development, mainly through Chinese factories that re-label goods for North American trade advantages. Mexico could gain leverage with Washington on migration, energy, and industry by partnering more with China and Canada. China’s intricate manufacturing supply chains could also help Mexico, which can work well with its industrial areas close to the U.S. border.

The United States could experience severe consequences. Its supply chain’s resilience would decline first. A strong production system could emerge near America, blending China’s manufacturing with Canada and Mexico’s strengths. Industries like batteries, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and clean energy might use inputs influenced by Chinese standards and funding. This would weaken Washington’s bid to onshore or “friend-shore” sensitive technologies.

Next, U.S. trade influence would decline. The U.S. has for a while controlled North American trade via NAFTA and the USMCA. Any kind of cooperation between the three would weaken America’s ability to enforce standards. U.S. businesses could be at a disadvantage in North America if Mexico and Canada use China’s trade model.

Moreover, the geopolitical symbolism would cause damage. The U.S. has always had influence in the Western Hemisphere. China gaining economic power next-door to the U.S. would be a big strategic problem. It would prove that U.S. alliances are no longer assured and that economic interdependence is unreliable.

Even if the alliance never crystallises formally, the very trend toward it would push Washington to confront a new reality: American dominance in North America is no longer automatic, and its rivals are learning to operate inside its front yard rather than across the ocean.

Conclusion: Decline Isn’t Doom

America’s $28 trillion GDP, 800 overseas bases, and innovation ecosystem endure. But as Venezuelan fields pump for Beijing and the G20 ignores Washington, the peril is relative erosion—not extinction. These crises are warning signals, not small details. A one-sided empire only becomes more isolated, while flexible leadership helps a country survive in a world with many power centres. The big question of this decade is whether the U.S. will remain a superpower or become just one among several equals. Will it negotiate or intimidate? The stakes are rising, and any U.S. misstep could reshape the entire world.

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The Indian National Congress at the Edge: Decline, Drift, and the Search for a New Political Future

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Is India’s Grand Old Party unable to fight the tide of pseudo-nationalism and inexorably sinking to irrelevance? Are its spasmodic performances in the polls a sign of a drowning ship’s struggle to stay afloat?

Let us find out.

Once upon a time, the Indian National Congress (INC) was a powerful nation-building force. It led India to independence and shaped its political imagination for decades. But that was once upon a time. Today, it is a scrawny version of the original. It stands at its most vulnerable moment since its inception. In the 2025 Bihar Assembly elections, the NDA won 202 of 243 seats and the Congress party could not even reach ten. It confirms a deeper, long-term decline. For more than a decade now, the party has struggled in national and state elections. The leadership has failed to understand India’s changing politics or adjust to new political realities. It has lost its national character, its organisational networks, its ideological clarity, and most importantly, its connect with aspirational voters who now dominate India’s demographic and political landscape.

Would it be realistic to expect the Congress Party to overhaul itself? Perhaps, India’s messy political future might be shaped by a new leader or a new party capable of addressing the country’s social, economic, and political churn?

How Congress Reached the Brink: A Slow Motion Collapse

Congress’s defeat in Bihar is part of a broader trajectory of electoral and organisational erosion. In the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the party managed to increase its tally to 99 seats, but this improvement was largely due to the INDIA bloc’s coordinated seat-sharing, regional alliances, and strong anti-incumbency in certain pockets. Beneath this surface-level revival lay a more troubling reality: the Congress’s individual vote share remained weak, its strike rate poor, and its dependence on allies overwhelming.

In Haryana, winning 37 out of 90 seats was not enough to form a government. In Maharashtra, the party collapsed to a mere 16 seats out of 288 despite being part of a supposedly formidable alliance. And in Bihar, it fared even worse, dropping to below 10 seats, with its vote share sinking below 5%. These outcomes reflect a consistent pattern: Congress performs poorly wherever it contests without the crutches of regional partners, particularly in the Hindi heartland, where it has virtually vanished as a political force.

Clearly, the party is suffering from structural rot and leadership crisis. It continues to revolve around the Gandhi family, particularly Rahul Gandhi. Despite the media optics, his leadership style has failed to enthuse voters and party workers. The infamous “high command culture” has continued to suffocate internal democracy, reducing state units to passive recipients of Delhi’s directives. New talent is discouraged, old talent migrates to the BJP, and ambitious leaders like Sachin Pilot, Milind Deora, and Jyotiraditya Scindia have either left or been sidelined. The likes of Kanhaiya Kumar are being rendered ineffective by mismanaging their roles.

The Congress today no longer inspires, organises, or even imagines what a modern political movement in India should look like.

Of course, the picture is not uniformly bleak. Congress remains relevant in parts of southern India where its secular, welfare-oriented message finds more traction. It also retains a sizeable national vote base, hovering around 20–21 percent, suggesting that the party is not electorally dead, but organisationally adrift and strategically misguided.

India’s Political Landscape: A Shift to Multipolar Pragmatism

The Bihar verdict must be understood within the broader reconfiguration of Indian politics after the 2024 general elections. The BJP remains the dominant force but now operates within a more constrained coalition environment, relying heavily on allies such as the TDP and JD(U). The era of unchallenged Modi-led centralisation has apparently given way to a hybrid phase wherein a strong BJP-led national governance is balanced by assertive regional players in key states.

This evolving equilibrium reveals three clear trends. First, regional parties are becoming indispensable to India’s political landscape. Leaders such as Tejaswi Yadav in Bihar, M.K. Stalin in Tamil Nadu, and Arvind Kejriwal in Delhi command loyal vote banks and increasingly act as ideological counterweights to the BJP. They are shaping debates on caste justice, federal rights, and welfare. These are the areas Congress once dominated. Second, mounting social and economic stresses are heavily influencing voter behaviour. Issues like youth unemployment, agrarian distress, and rising inequality remain unresolved. But the BJP’s combination of welfare delivery, digital outreach, and hyper-local organisation allows it to absorb public discontent before it turns into full-blown anti-incumbency. Third, India is entering a long-term era of multipolar political competition. The old Congress-versus-BJP binary is over; the new reality is a “BJP versus many” landscape, where shifting alliances, caste configurations, regional identities, and issue-based mobilisations determine outcomes. This environment is testing the Congress party, which has lost ideological clarity, organisational depth, and credible leadership. Without radical reinvention, it risks being reduced to a regional appendage, surviving mainly in the South while the rest of India reorganises around newer and more dynamic political centres.

Overhaul or Oblivion? The Road Ahead for Congress

So, can Congress reform itself? Theoretically, yes. Practically, the probability is low.

A genuine overhaul of the Congress Party would require a fundamental shift in its leadership and organisational culture. This would mean replacing the Gandhi family with a democratically elected leadership, rebuilding state-level cadres from scratch, and empowering young leaders with real autonomy rather than symbolic roles. The party also needs to embrace data-driven election strategies, modernise its communication and digital outreach to match contemporary political campaigning. It should have a clear, coherent ideological position on economic and social issues. These changes should not be cosmetic but deep structural transformation, which Congress has long avoided. However, it can no longer avoid them if it hopes to survive as a national force.

But none of these appear on the horizon. The Congress Working Committee continues to operate as a ceremonial body, devoted more to preserving the family’s centrality than confronting the party’s structural decay. Even when internal voices call for reform—as Shashi Tharoor and others have done repeatedly—they are sidelined or ignored.

Given these dynamics, the most likely scenario is incremental tinkering rather than radical reform. Congress will continue its slow decline in the Hindi heartland, maintain pockets of strength in the South, and rely heavily on allies for survival. This trajectory may keep the party alive, but only just.

If Not Congress, Then Who? Possible New Leaders and Emerging Forces

India’s political future may not hinge on the Congress Party at all, as several alternative scenarios are increasingly plausible. One possibility is that a visionary, non-dynastic leader from within Congress manages to break through the party’s internal resistance and spearhead a revival. But current power structures make this unlikely. Another scenario is the rise of a new political movement. Prashant Kishor’s Jan Suraaj offers an early glimpse of what a data-driven, development-oriented, caste-aware party could become, especially in states like Bihar. A third path involves regional coalitions taking over the national opposition space. RJD, DMK, AAP, SP, and TMC may form a federal alliance that may challenge the BJP more effectively than Congress in its current form. India could also witness the emergence of a charismatic outsider or technocrat—an Emmanuel Macron–type figure who bypasses traditional party structures to build a movement centred on governance, employment, technology, and clean politics. Finally, the BJP itself might undergo generational changes in the post-Modi era, producing leadership that is more moderate, technocratic, or federalist, reshaping national politics from within. Given present trajectories, India is far more likely to see new political actors or alliances rise to prominence than a Congress-led renaissance.

The Future of Indian Politics: Fragmentation, Federalism, and Competitive Stability

In the coming years, India is likely to witness a political landscape where the BJP remains dominant at the national level. But it will increasingly rely on coalition partners to govern. Regional parties will continue to grow in strength, pushing for greater federal autonomy and influencing national policy from the periphery. Consequently, the opposition space will become more fragmented. Congress may shrink in the northern states and newer political movements rise to fill the gap. Economic pressures—ranging from unemployment and inflation to widening inequality—are also likely to spark fresh political experiments. These may give rise to new centrist or left-of-centre platforms. India’s democracy may become more coalition-driven: messy, competitive, and shaped by constant negotiation rather than single-party dominance. This transition may not solve India’s current social and economic challenges overnight. But it will help generate new ideas, new leaders, and fresh political imaginations.

Conclusion: The End of the Old Congress, and the Birth of Something New

The Indian National Congress stands at a historic crossroads. Its decline is neither sudden nor temporary. It is the result of chronic leadership failures, structural decay, and ideological confusion. The Bihar election merely confirmed what has been true for years: Congress is no longer a national party in any meaningful sense.

Whether it undergoes a complete overhaul is uncertain, even improbable. India’s political future is more likely to be shaped by a new leadership constellation. It may emerge from within Congress, from regional forces, or entirely outside the current party system.

What is clear, however, is that India’s democracy is evolving. The next era will be defined not by the old Congress-versus-BJP binary but by multipolar competition. One sees regional assertion, coalition bargaining, and the search for a leader who can address the country’s deepening economic and social crises. Whether that leader emerges soon—or whether the vacuum persists—will decide India’s political future.

Perhaps we are looking at the rise of new ideologies and ideologues in the near future. Perhaps India’s political landscape will transform into something beyond recognition. Only time will tell.

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