Is the American “Empire” Accelerating Its Decline? Lessons from Venezuela’s Oil Standoff and the G20 Snub

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History is full of examples of the rise and fall of great powers and their empires. Roman, Ottoman, Mughal, Britain, and the Soviet Union etc. Now it is America’s turn.

After World War II, the United States became a global hegemon, facilitated by its unmatched military might, economic supremacy, technological edge, and institutional leadership in bodies like the United Nations and Bretton Woods system. This “American empire” shaped international norms, trade, and security. Yet, by late 2025, that edifice appears precarious. This foundation has been undermined by China and India’s growing influence, the Global South’s push for autonomy via forums like BRICS, the U.S. dollar’s decreased dominance, and widespread opposition to U.S. interventions. This is evident in recent events, such as the U.S.-Venezuela oil dispute and the unusual 2025 G20 Summit boycott. Such events mirror previous disagreements, like the U.S.’s 2023 pressure on Nigeria concerning oil theft and currency reforms, where Washington’s coercive methods distanced an African giant and expedited its move toward Chinese financial support. Recent events indicate China capitalising on North American disunity.

The Venezuela Oil Standoff: Coercion Backfiring in a Multipolar World

The Trump administration’s aggressive policy toward Venezuela shows how U.S. unilateralism harms allies while assisting rivals. In February 2025, Trump overturned Biden’s policies by canceling General License 41, which had let Chevron, the final significant U.S. oil company there, extract and sell Venezuelan crude. This triggered a six-month wind-down, cutting Chevron’s joint ventures, which produced around 25% of Venezuela’s output. By March, Trump used a 25% tariff on Venezuelan oil imports to target buyers such as China and India, in order to hurt Caracas’s $20-30 billion annual revenue.

The direct consequences have been striking. Venezuela’s oil output, which had recovered to roughly 1 million bpd in early 2025 due to eased sanctions, is now expected to fall to 800,000 bpd because of supply issues and lack of investment. Because US Gulf Coast refineries were made for Venezuela’s heavy sour crude, they now have a 150,000-200,000 bpd shortfall, causing costly substitutions from Canadian tar sands or Middle Eastern residues, which may increase US gasoline prices by up to $5 per barrel.

But Washington’s loss of power in Latin America is a greater geopolitical setback. Instead of isolating Maduro, these actions hastened Venezuela’s shift toward non-Western nations. China, which has been Venezuela’s biggest lender since 2005 with $60 billion in loans, has increased its investment. In May 2025, China Concord Resources Corp. signed a 20-year production-sharing agreement for two Lake Maracaibo fields. It has invested over $1 billion to increase output from 12,000 to 60,000 bpd by 2026. PDVSA - Venezuela’s state-owned oil and natural gas company - gets lighter crude, but heavier oil goes straight to China, avoiding US tariffs using “shadow fleets” and crypto payments; Maduro uses this to dodge sanctions, laundering about 2 billion dollars yearly via digital assets.

Moreover, Colombia and Brazil are building energy ties with Caracas, forming an “energy autonomy” bloc. Colombian President Gustavo Petro stated in November 2025 that U.S. pressure is about oil, not democracy. Venezuela’s defiance empowers post-dollar vision of the BRICS. Consequently, in long-term this would result in U.S. isolation, with oil possibly traded in yuan or rupees, decreasing the petrodollar’s 40% market share.

The G20 Boycott: A Snub That Exposes U.S. Irrelevance

Compounding the Venezuela debacle, a historic rupture was caused by the U.S. boycott of the November 22-23, 2025, G20 Summit in Johannesburg. The U.S. was unrepresented as Trump banned officials, falsely claiming “genocide” against South African farmers. Trump called the event a “total disgrace”. But the summit went ahead. It finalised a key 122-point agreement. This declaration addressed climate resilience, debt, inequality, and minerals, which Washington had previously blocked. Host Cyril Ramaphosa hailed it as proof the G20’s legitimacy “doesn’t hinge on the U.S.”. China’s Xi Jinping sent Premier Li Qiang, Russia dispatched a deputy due to ICC warrants, and Argentina’s Javier Milei was also absent in support of Trump, but despite this, the 17 leaders present, who together represent 75% of the world’s GDP, reached an agreement.

Trump’s boycott of the summit was denounced as “imperialist meddling with racial bias,” hurting an African-led forum. But it has boosted the Global South’s drive for alternatives like the G77+China bloc. Brazil’s Lula da Silva called the result a “triumph of multilateralism,” and Canadian PM Mark Carney said the world “can move on without the United States.”

As the dollar’s dominance wanes (BRICS nations now trade 28% of oil outside it), and institutions like the G20 evolve without the U.S., unilateralism risks turning America into a “spoiler,” as scholars like Joseph Nye warn—eroding soft power faster than hard power can compensate.

Two Paths Forward: Entrenchment or Adaptation?

More isolation would be risky for the United States. Continued pressure could push Venezuela closer to China and Russia. OPEC expects Venezuela to export 1.2 million barrels of oil per day to Asia by 2030. Latin America may also integrate through groups like Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), reducing U.S. influence. G20 boycotts are creating a form of diplomacy that works without the U.S., while BRICS is moving ahead with plans for a $50 billion development bank by 2027. The dollar is also under pressure: if 20% more oil is traded in other currencies, U.S. Treasury yields could rise by 1–2%, according to Federal Reserve models, worsening America’s $35 trillion debt burden. U.S. allies such as Europe and Japan are already hedging with euro–yuan currency swaps. They could drift further away, leaving Washington looking “volatile and unpopular” and more dependent on military power—much like Britain after the Suez crisis.

However, practical re-engagement may provide recovery. Rejoining multilateralism could temper decline: Diplomacy in Venezuela (e.g., conditional license renewals, as in July 2025) stabilises energy flows; G20 participation rebuilds moral authority. By focusing on alliances such as AUKUS and QUAD and attracting the Global South with debt swaps, the U.S. can become the leader in areas like AI ethics or green tech, where it has a 40% market share. Full hegemony is illusory, but shared influence preserves leverage: A 2025 CSIS report estimates adaptive U.S. policy could retain 70% of current sway by 2035, versus 50% under confrontation.

Global Ripples: Opportunities for the Rest

This junction changes the game for others. India gets strategic advantage from Russian oil ties and the G20, plus Chabahar’s role. African nations, like Nigeria and Ethiopia, have increased influence: Johannesburg’s success confirms AU-G20 partnerships, attracting $500 billion for minerals without US control. Latin America looks to gain sovereignty via PetroCaribe 2.0. The Global South is also advancing “contested multipolarity” with sovereign tech, regional currencies, and forums. The original PetroCaribe was a regional oil deal between Venezuela and Caribbean countries. Hugo Chávez was president when the trade organisation was established in Puerto La Cruz, Venezuela, on June 29, 2005. Venezuela offered oil to member states, with favourable financial terms. PetroCaribe played a role in the Latin American “pink tide,” aiming for post-neoliberal progress.

China-Canada-Mexico Form Anti-US Economic Unity

China, Canada, and Mexico may potentially form an economic alliance against the United States. This will result in deeper shifts in North America’s strategic environment. Such a trio would draw together America’s largest trading partners and its principal global rival, China, to create an unusual coalition that blends geographic proximity with geopolitical intent. Even without a formal treaty, coordination among these three economies could undercut the most important pillars of U.S. economic power: market access, supply-chain dominance, and regional leadership.

China would be the strategic driver. Beijing could use an alliance with Canada and Mexico to bypass the U.S.A.’s control over North American trade. China could lessen its reliance on U.S. markets by collaborating with America’s neighbours, protect itself from Washington’s export controls, and directly influence U.S. supply chains. China’s industrial strategy avoids U.S. constraints, particularly in EVs, batteries, rare earths, and solar. This would be reinforced through greater collaboration with Canada’s minerals and Mexico’s cheap manufacturing.

Canada would be motivated by both economic and political factors. Ottawa and Washington have faced strain due to disagreements over security, tech, and trade. Canada could gain leverage and diversify its market by opening its economy to China and Mexico. Meanwhile, Canada has huge stores of essential minerals like lithium, nickel, and cobalt, which China needs. A joint structure could solidify lasting investment and guarantee demand, while Ottawa keeps its official U.S. links.

Mexico’s strategy is similarly practical. Its economy depends heavily on the U.S., yet it has secretly used China for development, mainly through Chinese factories that re-label goods for North American trade advantages. Mexico could gain leverage with Washington on migration, energy, and industry by partnering more with China and Canada. China’s intricate manufacturing supply chains could also help Mexico, which can work well with its industrial areas close to the U.S. border.

The United States could experience severe consequences. Its supply chain’s resilience would decline first. A strong production system could emerge near America, blending China’s manufacturing with Canada and Mexico’s strengths. Industries like batteries, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and clean energy might use inputs influenced by Chinese standards and funding. This would weaken Washington’s bid to onshore or “friend-shore” sensitive technologies.

Next, U.S. trade influence would decline. The U.S. has for a while controlled North American trade via NAFTA and the USMCA. Any kind of cooperation between the three would weaken America’s ability to enforce standards. U.S. businesses could be at a disadvantage in North America if Mexico and Canada use China’s trade model.

Moreover, the geopolitical symbolism would cause damage. The U.S. has always had influence in the Western Hemisphere. China gaining economic power next-door to the U.S. would be a big strategic problem. It would prove that U.S. alliances are no longer assured and that economic interdependence is unreliable.

Even if the alliance never crystallises formally, the very trend toward it would push Washington to confront a new reality: American dominance in North America is no longer automatic, and its rivals are learning to operate inside its front yard rather than across the ocean.

Conclusion: Decline Isn’t Doom

America’s $28 trillion GDP, 800 overseas bases, and innovation ecosystem endure. But as Venezuelan fields pump for Beijing and the G20 ignores Washington, the peril is relative erosion—not extinction. These crises are warning signals, not small details. A one-sided empire only becomes more isolated, while flexible leadership helps a country survive in a world with many power centres. The big question of this decade is whether the U.S. will remain a superpower or become just one among several equals. Will it negotiate or intimidate? The stakes are rising, and any U.S. misstep could reshape the entire world.

Trump, G-20, Johannesburg, Caracas, Venezuela, Xi Jinping, Putin, India, Crude Oil, Russia, Argentina, NAFTA, Brazil, Mexico, Canada, Hugo Chávez , OPEC,  Nigeria, Ethiopia, Lake Maracaibo, Green Tech, AUKUS, QUAD, PetroCaribe

The Indian National Congress at the Edge: Decline, Drift, and the Search for a New Political Future

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Is India’s Grand Old Party unable to fight the tide of pseudo-nationalism and inexorably sinking to irrelevance? Are its spasmodic performances in the polls a sign of a drowning ship’s struggle to stay afloat?

Let us find out.

Once upon a time, the Indian National Congress (INC) was a powerful nation-building force. It led India to independence and shaped its political imagination for decades. But that was once upon a time. Today, it is a scrawny version of the original. It stands at its most vulnerable moment since its inception. In the 2025 Bihar Assembly elections, the NDA won 202 of 243 seats and the Congress party could not even reach ten. It confirms a deeper, long-term decline. For more than a decade now, the party has struggled in national and state elections. The leadership has failed to understand India’s changing politics or adjust to new political realities. It has lost its national character, its organisational networks, its ideological clarity, and most importantly, its connect with aspirational voters who now dominate India’s demographic and political landscape.

Would it be realistic to expect the Congress Party to overhaul itself? Perhaps, India’s messy political future might be shaped by a new leader or a new party capable of addressing the country’s social, economic, and political churn?

How Congress Reached the Brink: A Slow Motion Collapse

Congress’s defeat in Bihar is part of a broader trajectory of electoral and organisational erosion. In the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the party managed to increase its tally to 99 seats, but this improvement was largely due to the INDIA bloc’s coordinated seat-sharing, regional alliances, and strong anti-incumbency in certain pockets. Beneath this surface-level revival lay a more troubling reality: the Congress’s individual vote share remained weak, its strike rate poor, and its dependence on allies overwhelming.

In Haryana, winning 37 out of 90 seats was not enough to form a government. In Maharashtra, the party collapsed to a mere 16 seats out of 288 despite being part of a supposedly formidable alliance. And in Bihar, it fared even worse, dropping to below 10 seats, with its vote share sinking below 5%. These outcomes reflect a consistent pattern: Congress performs poorly wherever it contests without the crutches of regional partners, particularly in the Hindi heartland, where it has virtually vanished as a political force.

Clearly, the party is suffering from structural rot and leadership crisis. It continues to revolve around the Gandhi family, particularly Rahul Gandhi. Despite the media optics, his leadership style has failed to enthuse voters and party workers. The infamous “high command culture” has continued to suffocate internal democracy, reducing state units to passive recipients of Delhi’s directives. New talent is discouraged, old talent migrates to the BJP, and ambitious leaders like Sachin Pilot, Milind Deora, and Jyotiraditya Scindia have either left or been sidelined. The likes of Kanhaiya Kumar are being rendered ineffective by mismanaging their roles.

The Congress today no longer inspires, organises, or even imagines what a modern political movement in India should look like.

Of course, the picture is not uniformly bleak. Congress remains relevant in parts of southern India where its secular, welfare-oriented message finds more traction. It also retains a sizeable national vote base, hovering around 20–21 percent, suggesting that the party is not electorally dead, but organisationally adrift and strategically misguided.

India’s Political Landscape: A Shift to Multipolar Pragmatism

The Bihar verdict must be understood within the broader reconfiguration of Indian politics after the 2024 general elections. The BJP remains the dominant force but now operates within a more constrained coalition environment, relying heavily on allies such as the TDP and JD(U). The era of unchallenged Modi-led centralisation has apparently given way to a hybrid phase wherein a strong BJP-led national governance is balanced by assertive regional players in key states.

This evolving equilibrium reveals three clear trends. First, regional parties are becoming indispensable to India’s political landscape. Leaders such as Tejaswi Yadav in Bihar, M.K. Stalin in Tamil Nadu, and Arvind Kejriwal in Delhi command loyal vote banks and increasingly act as ideological counterweights to the BJP. They are shaping debates on caste justice, federal rights, and welfare. These are the areas Congress once dominated. Second, mounting social and economic stresses are heavily influencing voter behaviour. Issues like youth unemployment, agrarian distress, and rising inequality remain unresolved. But the BJP’s combination of welfare delivery, digital outreach, and hyper-local organisation allows it to absorb public discontent before it turns into full-blown anti-incumbency. Third, India is entering a long-term era of multipolar political competition. The old Congress-versus-BJP binary is over; the new reality is a “BJP versus many” landscape, where shifting alliances, caste configurations, regional identities, and issue-based mobilisations determine outcomes. This environment is testing the Congress party, which has lost ideological clarity, organisational depth, and credible leadership. Without radical reinvention, it risks being reduced to a regional appendage, surviving mainly in the South while the rest of India reorganises around newer and more dynamic political centres.

Overhaul or Oblivion? The Road Ahead for Congress

So, can Congress reform itself? Theoretically, yes. Practically, the probability is low.

A genuine overhaul of the Congress Party would require a fundamental shift in its leadership and organisational culture. This would mean replacing the Gandhi family with a democratically elected leadership, rebuilding state-level cadres from scratch, and empowering young leaders with real autonomy rather than symbolic roles. The party also needs to embrace data-driven election strategies, modernise its communication and digital outreach to match contemporary political campaigning. It should have a clear, coherent ideological position on economic and social issues. These changes should not be cosmetic but deep structural transformation, which Congress has long avoided. However, it can no longer avoid them if it hopes to survive as a national force.

But none of these appear on the horizon. The Congress Working Committee continues to operate as a ceremonial body, devoted more to preserving the family’s centrality than confronting the party’s structural decay. Even when internal voices call for reform—as Shashi Tharoor and others have done repeatedly—they are sidelined or ignored.

Given these dynamics, the most likely scenario is incremental tinkering rather than radical reform. Congress will continue its slow decline in the Hindi heartland, maintain pockets of strength in the South, and rely heavily on allies for survival. This trajectory may keep the party alive, but only just.

If Not Congress, Then Who? Possible New Leaders and Emerging Forces

India’s political future may not hinge on the Congress Party at all, as several alternative scenarios are increasingly plausible. One possibility is that a visionary, non-dynastic leader from within Congress manages to break through the party’s internal resistance and spearhead a revival. But current power structures make this unlikely. Another scenario is the rise of a new political movement. Prashant Kishor’s Jan Suraaj offers an early glimpse of what a data-driven, development-oriented, caste-aware party could become, especially in states like Bihar. A third path involves regional coalitions taking over the national opposition space. RJD, DMK, AAP, SP, and TMC may form a federal alliance that may challenge the BJP more effectively than Congress in its current form. India could also witness the emergence of a charismatic outsider or technocrat—an Emmanuel Macron–type figure who bypasses traditional party structures to build a movement centred on governance, employment, technology, and clean politics. Finally, the BJP itself might undergo generational changes in the post-Modi era, producing leadership that is more moderate, technocratic, or federalist, reshaping national politics from within. Given present trajectories, India is far more likely to see new political actors or alliances rise to prominence than a Congress-led renaissance.

The Future of Indian Politics: Fragmentation, Federalism, and Competitive Stability

In the coming years, India is likely to witness a political landscape where the BJP remains dominant at the national level. But it will increasingly rely on coalition partners to govern. Regional parties will continue to grow in strength, pushing for greater federal autonomy and influencing national policy from the periphery. Consequently, the opposition space will become more fragmented. Congress may shrink in the northern states and newer political movements rise to fill the gap. Economic pressures—ranging from unemployment and inflation to widening inequality—are also likely to spark fresh political experiments. These may give rise to new centrist or left-of-centre platforms. India’s democracy may become more coalition-driven: messy, competitive, and shaped by constant negotiation rather than single-party dominance. This transition may not solve India’s current social and economic challenges overnight. But it will help generate new ideas, new leaders, and fresh political imaginations.

Conclusion: The End of the Old Congress, and the Birth of Something New

The Indian National Congress stands at a historic crossroads. Its decline is neither sudden nor temporary. It is the result of chronic leadership failures, structural decay, and ideological confusion. The Bihar election merely confirmed what has been true for years: Congress is no longer a national party in any meaningful sense.

Whether it undergoes a complete overhaul is uncertain, even improbable. India’s political future is more likely to be shaped by a new leadership constellation. It may emerge from within Congress, from regional forces, or entirely outside the current party system.

What is clear, however, is that India’s democracy is evolving. The next era will be defined not by the old Congress-versus-BJP binary but by multipolar competition. One sees regional assertion, coalition bargaining, and the search for a leader who can address the country’s deepening economic and social crises. Whether that leader emerges soon—or whether the vacuum persists—will decide India’s political future.

Perhaps we are looking at the rise of new ideologies and ideologues in the near future. Perhaps India’s political landscape will transform into something beyond recognition. Only time will tell.

Indian National Congress, BJP, TMC, DMK, BSP, Samajwadi Party, TDP, RJD, JD(U), Rahul Gandhi, Priyanka, Narendra Modi, Amit Shah, Karnataka, Bihar, CEC, Prashant Kishor, 

Article 240, Chandigarh, and the 131st Amendment

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What Is Article 240?

Article 240 of the Indian Constitution gives the President the authority to issue regulations for certain Union Territories (UTs) “for the peace, progress and good governance” of those regions. These regulations operate with the same force as Acts of Parliament and can even amend or repeal existing parliamentary laws applicable to those territories. The purpose of this provision is to allow the Union government to swiftly legislate in territories that do not have legislatures of their own.

This presidential power, however, is not intended to be permanent everywhere. Under Article 239A, when a Union Territory establishes its own legislature—as Puducherry has—the President’s regulatory power under Article 240 normally ceases from the date of that legislature’s first sitting. As of now, Article 240 applies mainly to UTs without legislative assemblies, including the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Lakshadweep, and the merged territory of Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu. Puducherry comes under Article 240 only if its assembly is dissolved or suspended.

Chandigarh has never been governed under Article 240. Though it is a Union Territory, it is administered directly by the President under Article 239 through an Administrator who is, in practice, the Governor of Punjab holding additional charge. Despite lacking a legislature of its own, Chandigarh is governed through this hybrid arrangement involving central oversight and local municipal governance rather than through presidential regulations like other small UTs.

The Proposed Constitutional Change: Bringing Chandigarh Under Article 240

In late 2025, the Union Government listed the Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill, 2025 for introduction in the Winter Session of Parliament. The bill sought to include Chandigarh within the scope of Article 240, thereby giving the President the authority to issue binding regulations for the Union Territory. Such a change would place Chandigarh in the same legal category as UTs without legislatures and would have given the Centre greater flexibility in framing laws for the city.

A major administrative consequence of this move would be the appointment of a full-time Lieutenant Governor (LG) or Administrator dedicated solely to Chandigarh, replacing the long-standing practice of the Punjab Governor overseeing it. According to the government’s stated rationale, this would “simplify the law-making process” for the city and streamline administrative control, but without altering its shared-capital status for Punjab and Haryana or disturbing established arrangements such as shared institutions, joint police infrastructure, or inter-state service structures.

However, soon after the bill appeared in parliamentary bulletins, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) issued a clarification on November 23, 2025, stating that no such bill would be introduced in the Winter Session. The MHA emphasised that the proposal was still “under consideration,” that no final decision had been taken, and that any movement on the matter would require consultations with all stakeholders. The government also clarified that it had no intention of disturbing Chandigarh’s traditional administrative arrangements or its symbolic status as the shared capital of Punjab and Haryana.

The abrupt clarification effectively put the proposal on hold and indicated that the government had misjudged the political sensitivity of the issue.

How Serious Is the Modi Government About This Change?

The Centre’s quick retreat suggests that it was testing political waters rather than pushing a pre-finalised reform. The strong and immediate opposition from multiple political parties—across ideological boundaries—forced the government to step back and avoid escalation ahead of the crucial parliamentary session.

In Punjab, the reaction was especially fierce. Chief Minister Bhagwant Mann described the proposal as an attempt to “snatch Chandigarh,” while leaders from the Congress and Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) argued that bringing Chandigarh under Article 240 would erode Punjab’s claim over the city and weaken the delicate balance established after the 1966 reorganisation of Punjab and Haryana. Even the Punjab BJP avoided defending the bill, aware of the emotional weight Chandigarh carries for Punjabi voters. The rare display of political unity suggested that this issue cut across party lines, with all major groups viewing it as a matter of Punjabi identity and historical rights.

In Haryana, the response was more cautious. While some saw the possibility of administrative streamlining through an independent LG, others feared that altering Chandigarh’s constitutional status could disrupt long-standing joint arrangements relating to policing, staff allocations, university affiliations, and shared infrastructure. The BJP-led government in the state also faced pressure not to appear complicit in a move that Punjab framed as an “attack” on its rights.

At the national level, the backlash risked strengthening opposition narratives about federal overreach. In states where the BJP is not in power, particularly border and sensitive regions, the proposal was seen as another example of the Centre asserting greater control—similar to the controversies surrounding the role of Lieutenant Governors in Delhi and Jammu & Kashmir. The government’s rapid clarification indicated a recognition that the political cost outweighed the administrative benefit, at least in the short term.

Political Consequences and Emerging Dynamics

The episode triggered a renewed debate on federalism, centre-state relations, and the symbolism of Chandigarh as more than just a Union Territory. For Punjab, Chandigarh has historically represented unfulfilled promises, especially since several national governments have avoided resolving the city’s final status despite earlier commitments to transfer it fully to Punjab. The proposal, therefore, revived these emotions and highlighted the fragility of trust between the Centre and the state.

In Punjab, the controversy has temporarily unified political actors who are otherwise deeply divided. Aam Aadmi Party, Congress, and Shiromani Akali Dal are all positioning themselves as defenders of Punjab’s rights, using the Centre’s proposal as evidence of alleged attempts to dilute the state’s authority. This solidarity could strengthen anti-BJP sentiment in the run-up to the 2027 state elections. It may also increase pressure on the Centre during negotiations on agricultural reforms, state finances, or federal grants, as the state government becomes less willing to appear cooperative.

In Haryana, the political consequences are subtler. While the BJP-led state government wants to appear aligned with the Centre, it also must protect local sentiment regarding Chandigarh’s joint status. Opposition parties in Haryana are already highlighting the ambiguity and potential risks of the Centre’s proposal, arguing that any disruption to shared governance could affect both states adversely. Although the issue is unlikely to trigger mass protests, it could influence political narratives and provide openings for local opposition groups.

Himachal Pradesh, by contrast, is largely a peripheral stakeholder. While it shares institutional ties to Chandigarh—especially through universities and economic corridors—it is unlikely to be directly affected by changes to the city’s constitutional status. The Congress-ruled state may, however, echo Punjab’s concerns about excessive centralisation as part of a broader opposition strategy in northern India.

At the national level, the controversy reinforces an ongoing narrative about the centralisation of authority under the BJP government. Opposition parties may use the Chandigarh episode to argue that the Centre increasingly seeks to expand its control over territories and institutions, from Jammu & Kashmir to Delhi, and now potentially Chandigarh. This line of attack could further solidify the INDIA Bloc’s federalism platform as the 2029 general elections draw closer.

Overall Assessment

The Centre’s proposal to extend Article 240 to Chandigarh has been effectively paused, yet it remains formally “under consideration.” The government’s retreat shows that it underestimated the emotional and political resonance of Chandigarh’s status, especially in Punjab. Although the Ministry of Home Affairs insists that the core aim was only to streamline administrative processes, the backlash has made it clear that any attempt to modify Chandigarh’s governance structure carries significant political risk.

However, the idea could re-emerge after extensive consultations, but its future depends on whether the Centre can build consensus among Punjab, Haryana, and local stakeholders. For now, the episode has reinforced regional distrust, exposed the limits of administrative reforms in sensitive border states, and revived long-standing debates on the meaning of federalism in India.

Article 240, 131st Amendment, Chandigarh, Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Constitution, AAP, Akali Dal, Congress Party, Bhagwant Mann, Modi, Amit Shah

Indira Gandhi: Beyond the Shadows of Triumph and Turmoil

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Frail-looking but fiercely independent, Indira Gandhi remains one of the most polarising figures in modern Indian history. She inherited not just a legacy of independence but also the weight of responsibilities that would test her to the extreme. She served as India’s prime minister from 1966 to 1977, and again from 1980 until her assassination in 1984. Her long tenure reshaped India’s political, economic and social landscape.

She was not a mere sum-total of the triumphs of the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, the Garibi Hatao campaign, and the lows of the 1975-77 Emergency and Operation Blue Star in 1984. There were multifaceted dimensions of her statesmanship. Indira was a pragmatist who navigated a nascent democracy through economic fragility, regional insurgencies and Cold War intrigues. Which she often did at the cost of institutional norms. Her legacy is not just a ledger of victories and defeats but a testament to the complexities of leading a diverse post-colonial giant, which India is.

The Persona: Iron Lady or Enigmatic Matriarch?

Indira Gandhi’s personal charisma was as potent as her policies. She blended vulnerability with unyielding authority. She was often dubbed the Iron Lady by foreign observers during the tense U.S.–India negotiations in the 1970s.

Although reserved by nature she cultivated a public image of Durga-like invincibility — especially after the 1971 war when opposition leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee hailed her as “the goddess of power”. Beneath this façade, however, lay a woman shaped by personal tragedy: the early death of her mother in 1936, the passing of her husband Feroze Gandhi in 1960 from a heart attack, and her son Sanjay Gandhi’s fatal plane crash in 1980. These losses forged her into a fiercely protective figure, viewing politics as an extension of familial duty.

Unlike her father’s intellectualism and institutional bent, she favoured direct engagement with the masses. As Congress president, she travelled to remote villages in the 1950s, engaged with women on child-health and crafts, and developed a bond with rural women who saw her as a “Mother India” figure. She rejected explicit feminism — insisting she was “not a feminist” but believed in equal opportunities — a stance that symbolised women’s potential without challenging patriarchal structures.

Dismissed as a goongi gudiya or dumb doll by the likes of Lohiya and Congress bosses, she quietly dismantled their influence and asserted control. She was a tender matriarch to the poor and a ruthless strategist to rivals. This made her magnetic yet divisive — her cult of personality (encapsulated in the slogan “Indira is India”) permeated the Indian psyche. Her style influenced successors, embedding personalisation in Indian leadership. It also sowed seeds of nepotism, as seen in grooming Sanjay and later Rajiv Gandhi for politics.

Indira’s persona reflected cultural syncretism. Although she drew inspiration from figures like Joan of Arc for defiance and Mahatma Gandhi for non-violence, her decisions often veered toward realpolitik. In private correspondence and speeches she revealed insecurities about her English-education conflicting with India’s multilingual ethos. This fed policies like the 1967 decision on Hindi-English bilingualism.

Politics: From Syndicate Puppet to Congress Supremo

Indira’s political journey was a masterclass in adaptation. She transformed from a reluctant heir to an unchallenged supreme leader. In the 1950s she entered politics, first as Congress President, which was a largely ceremonial post, and then through more active roles. She had little patience with democratic processes. This became evident in 1959, when she engineered the dismissal of Kerala’s Communist government. 

After Nehru’s death in 1964, she joined Lal Bahadur Shastri’s cabinet as Information Minister and gained administrative training during the 1965 Indo-Pak war. Her elevation to Prime Minister in 1966 was a compromise arranged by the Congress “Syndicate” of senior regional leaders. However, she rapidly moved to shake off their influence. In 1969 she nationalised the banks in a dramatic move — without consultation — thus provoking a split in the Congress into Congress (R) backing her and Congress (O) backing the old guard. This was partly sparked by her support for V. V. Giri’s presidential campaign and her determination to “stand with the people”.

Her Congress (R) won 352 of 518 Lok Sabha seats during the 1971 general elections. This validated her populist strategy of aligning with regional outfits like the DMK in Tamil Nadu and using anti-establishment rhetoric. She blended Nehruvian socialism with Gandhian populism. But she had no qualms while eroding federalism by imposing President’s Rule in nine states by 1977 to install loyalists.

After the Emergency, which spanned 1975-77, she was defeated by the Janata Party, but made a dramatic comeback in 1980. She secured 353 seats in the Lok Sabha. Her electoral genius lay in micro-mobilisation like anti-poverty schemes. She bypassed upper-caste intermediaries and empowered OBCs and Dalits in the Hindi heartland.

Yet this political style came at a cost: ordinances bypassed Parliament; a “kitchen cabinet” of aides such as P. N. Haksar sidestepped formal institutions; inner-party democracy eroded. She reshaped the Congress into a centralised machine, influencing India’s shift from consensus politics to majoritarian democracy — at the expense of institutional autonomy.

Achievements: Architect of Self-Reliance

Indira Gandhi’s achievements went far beyond winning the 1971 war. She introduced major structural changes that strengthened India’s independence and long-term stability.

One of her biggest contributions was ensuring food security. The Green Revolution picked up speed during her tenure. By 1972, India became self-sufficient in food, and by 1975 it even exported grain. In 1974, she authorised India’s first nuclear test, known as “Smiling Buddha,” which marked a bold step toward strategic autonomy. She also oversaw the 1975 merger of Sikkim with India through a referendum, and later, in 1984, launched Operation Meghdoot to secure the Siachen Glacier from Pakistan.

Indira also reshaped India’s financial system. On 19 July 1969, she nationalised 14 major commercial banks that controlled most of the country’s deposits. She said the goal was to support faster growth in agriculture, small industries, exports, and rural development. This move expanded banking access across the country. Bank branches increased from about 8,200 in 1969 to more than 65,000 by 2000, greatly improving credit availability in villages and small towns.

Another major reform was the abolition of privy purses. Through the 26th Constitutional Amendment in 1971, she ended the official recognition and special payments given to former princes. Indira argued that this was essential to uphold equality among all citizens.

Her leadership during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War gave India a decisive victory and significantly raised India’s influence in the region. In foreign policy, she maintained a non-aligned position but developed strong ties with the Soviet Union, securing affordable military support. She supported global causes such as the fight against apartheid, the rights of Palestinians, and regional cooperation through the launch of SAARC in 1983.

Together, these actions helped shift India from an aid-dependent nation to a more confident, self-reliant power. Her welfare messaging, especially the slogan Garibi Hatao in 1971, became a defining part of her political legacy.

Failures: The Cost of Centralisation

Indira Gandhi’s mistakes were as serious as her achievements, and many came from her desire to centralise power.

The biggest and most damaging error was the Emergency from 1975 to 1977. On 25 June 1975, the President declared a national emergency on her advice, citing “internal disturbance.” During this period, citizens lost basic freedoms, opposition leaders were jailed, the press was censored, and several constitutional changes were made to give the government more control. The Emergency ended only after she lost the 1977 election.

This period also saw many authoritarian abuses. A forced sterilisation campaign, driven mainly by her son Sanjay Gandhi, led to millions of men being sterilised. There were widespread misuse of ordinances, harsh demolition drives in Delhi in 1976, and strong action against anyone who criticised the government. These actions left deep marks on India’s democracy, which endure to this day.

Her approach in Punjab brought further trouble. She initially supported Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale to weaken the Akali Dal, but this strategy backfired. In June 1984, she ordered Operation Blue Star, a military action inside the Golden Temple. This angered many Sikhs and led to her assassination on 31 October 1984 by her Sikh bodyguards. The assassination was followed by anti-Sikh riots in which thousands died. The adverse consequences are being felt even now.

There were also economic costs. Although bank nationalisation improved access to credit, it reduced efficiency. The public sector became slow and resistant to innovation. The licence-raj system choked private enterprise, and by the early 1980s India was growing much slower than other Asian countries.

Indira’s long tussles with institutions also weakened democratic checks and balances. She frequently clashed with the judiciary and parliament. The famous 1973 Kesavananda Bharati judgement — which said that constitutional amendments cannot change the “basic structure” of the Constitution — was a direct response to her attempts to expand her power through the 24th and 25th amendments.

Legacy: A Fractured Icon

Indira’s legacy endures as a double-edged sword. She is hailed as a symbol of female empowerment and assertive nationalism. She was voted BBC’s Woman of the Millennium in 1999. But her tenure is a cautionary tale of power unchecked.

Her reforms, like bank nationalisation, rural branch expansion, and abolition of princely privileges, created a welfare-state infrastructure and opened politics to the marginalised OBCs and Dalits. In economic terms, her push for self-reliance laid groundwork for later liberalisation, though delayed. In foreign policy, her assertive Third-World leadership inspired Global South states.

Yet her downsides remain. For example, executive overreach, erosion of civil liberties, and the decline of Congress Party’s inner-party democracy. The influence of her style of personalised leadership and centralisation remains till today. As populism rises globally, her model of charismatic centralisation resonates uneasily and raises questions: how does a democracy balance strong leadership and institutional safeguards?

Indira Gandhi’s story reminds us that greatness often exacts a democratic toll. She was more than her headlines: a visionary who fed a billion and armed a nation, yet also a cautionary tale of power’s perils. Statesmanship in a post-colonial democracy demands both empathy and restraint. She forged India anew, flaws and all. In balancing empathy with expediency, she teaches that the path to greatness may cast long shadows.

Indira Gandhi, Lal Bahadur Shastri, Syndicate, Bangladesh War, Pakistan, United States, Jawaharlal Nehru, Lohia, Bank Nationalisation, Global South