Monday, February 12, 2024

Pakistan’s Oligarchy of Generals versus Democracy

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It will not be wrong to describe Pakistan as the Oligarchy of Generals. The military top brass have been ruling the roost for several decades. The recent election results have significant implications for them. The generals have remained true to form and done what they have been doing since the country’s birth. But, Imran Khan’s supporters have posed a mortal challenge to their hegemony. Before we go any further on the Army’s manipulative shenanigans and the civilian pushback, let us have a look at how the latest election results may affect Pakistan’s political, economic, and strategic health.

1. Political Impact:

a. Imran Khan’s Victory Against Unnerving Odds:

Candidates backed by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), the party founded and led by Imran Khan, secured a stunning victory after bitterly contested polls. This is despite Khan being barred from politics and jailed. In the weeks leading up to elections, PTI leaders faced arrests, protests were outlawed, and the media gagged—part of a clear military-led effort to sabotage PTI’s chances.

Independent candidates affiliated with Imran Khan's PTI have secured 93 Assembly seats. Nawaz Sharif's PML-N won 75 seats. Bhutto-Zardari’s Pakistan People's Party (PPP) secured 53 seats, and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement Pakistan (MQM-P) got 17 seats out of 265 National. These are supposed to be “official” figures. There have been claims of the PTI having actually won 173 seats. But even the Pakistan Election Commission’s figures show that the voters have rejected the military backing for Sharif.

b. The Military Facing Public Pushback:

Pakistan’s military has historically been the most powerful broker wielding control over weak civilian governments through coercion and cooption. Former Prime Minister Sharif, known to have close military ties in the past, claimed victory to form the government—but faces legitimacy issues. For the military, engineering an election win while jailing the principal opponent, Khan, proved impossible because of PTI’s popularity. For whatever reasons unexpectedly large number of Pakistanis have voted in favour of the candidates affiliated to the PTI. The establishment may be forced to change tactics from overt threats to more subtle influence. Buying and appeasing Imran Khan’s allies is not ruled out. After all horse trading is a common feature of South Asian democracies.

c. An Uncertain Coalition Politics on the Horizon:

With no party having won a clear majority, a coalition government supported by smaller regional parties seems likely. Sharif has already invited the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) to join him. A potential coalition between PML-N, PPP, and other parties may secure majority seats. However, smaller parties might extract steep concessions for their support, given PML-N’s lack of a majority. This could hamper governance. The military could still influence coalition-building efforts behind the scenes to ensure that the national security policy space remains protected, regardless of public disappointment over electoral engineering.

PTI’s against-the-odds electoral victory has dented the military’s image as the ultimate arbiter of power in Pakistan’s fragile democracy. But the generals remain relevant in the absence of a single-party majority—volatility that could weaken civilian rule without meaningful power-sharing. If we go by the reports that several PML-N candidates were not allowed to win by the Army, the generals may have manipulated the elections in such a manner that no political party gets the majority in the parliament. This would enable them to play the puppeteer with impunity – a role they play with great aplomb. 

Although far-fetched, what if Imran Khan becomes the Prime Minister again? This is possible if the claim of 173 seats for PTI turns out to be true. Would that spell the end of the Republic of Generals?

2. Economic Implications:

Pakistan is grappling with a severe economic crisis characterised by dwindling foreign currency reserves, high inflation touching 27%, and a widening current account deficit. The country faces a $1 billion bond payment due in two months, further straining its precarious financial situation. The $3 billion funding program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) expires on April 12. The new government would need to negotiate urgently to prevent default.

An IMF bailout with strict conditionalities seems imminent. But reforms mandated by the IMF could stir public anger over rising inflation. Seeking aid from friendly countries like China and Saudi Arabia could provide temporary relief but increase dependency. Creating employment, and tackling poverty and inequality also require long-pending structural reforms—from tax policy to governance. Initiatives around CPEC have slowed because of political changes. Bringing projects back on track is important for growth.

The election stalemate has raised grave concerns about Pakistan’s ability to tackle its economic crisis, secure crucial foreign funding, implement reforms and maintain internal stability. Pakistan’s political and economic uncertainty may worsen. Restoring macroeconomic stability should be the top-most priority, including bolstering foreign currency reserves and bringing debt under control. Hard decisions around subsidy cuts, privatisation, and austerity measures need political will.

3. Strategic Considerations:

Pakistan’s geographic location at the crossroads of South and Central Asia has strategic importance, yet also poses complex foreign policy and security challenges. Bordering Afghanistan, China, India and Iran, Pakistan sits amidst multiple fault lines. Tensions with India over the disputed Kashmir region periodically spike, raising the risk of conflict between the nuclear-armed foes. Pakistan also faces threats from domestic and cross-border terrorism, traced to groups operating along the porous Afghan-Pakistani border. Securing stability in Pakistan is thus critical for regional security and global efforts to curb nuclear proliferation.

Pakistan’s relations with the major powers further complicate its geopolitical manoeuvring. After the US withdrew from Afghanistan, the China-Pakistan partnership has intensified significantly. Chinese investment in Pakistani infrastructure, energy, and ports through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) tops $60 billion. While boosting Pakistan’s development, this nexus with China alarms the US and India. Meanwhile, the new coalition government in Islamabad will face the complex task of managing relations with the Afghan Taliban while containing domestic militancy. Despite stated counterterrorism commitments, militant groups retain influence within Pakistan.

Navigating these interconnected policy dilemmas requires deft diplomacy and leadership. Pakistan aims to balance ties to competing major powers while asserting its national interests. Regional security and prosperity will depend on Pakistan’s ability to consolidate domestic stability and peaceful relations with its neighbours. A less crisis-ridden South Asia is the ideal scenario, but getting there poses profound challenges for Pakistani statecraft.

How the Military Ascended to Power

The history of Pakistan’s military is a complex tapestry of conflicts, struggles, and political manoeuvring. Let’s explore how the Pakistan Army has wielded substantial influence over the country’s governance:

1. The British Colonial Origins:

The history of the Pakistan military’s roots trace back to the British Indian Army regiments comprising troops and officers from today’s Pakistan. The modern Pakistan Army was born out of military units allocated to Pakistan after the 1947 partition. Many early Pakistani military leaders like Ayub Khan had fought for the British during World Wars, shaping the Army’s professional outlook. Despite its basis as a parliamentary democracy, the military rapidly emerged as the most cohesive and organised institution wielding power in the fledgling state, struggling with existential threats, massive refugee flows and resource constraints after independence.

2. Military Coups and Political Interventions Over Decades:

Political stability has never been a feature of Pakistan’s polity. The Dominion of Pakistan was established on August 14th, 1947, upon the end of British rule in India. The Muslim League leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah became Pakistan’s first Governor-General, while Liaquat Ali Khan took charge as the nation’s inaugural Prime Minister. Jinnah is considered the founder of Pakistan, having led the push for an independent Muslim homeland on the subcontinent.

Jinnah died on September 11th, 1948, just 13 months into Pakistan’s existence. This first transfer of power was significant, as it deprived the fledgling nation of its highly respected founding leader and guiding force. Liaquat Ali Khan took over additional powers in the aftermath.

Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was shot dead on October 16th, 1951 while addressing a public rally. His assassination caused tremendous political instability and conflict within Pakistan’s government in the early years of independence.

Pakistan’s first homegrown constitution was approved and implemented in March 1956, formally declaring the nation an “Islamic Republic.” It established a parliamentary form of government with a National Assembly and electoral process.

On 27 October 1958, General Ayub Khan seized power in the nation’s first military coup. He suspended the constitution, imposed martial law, and dismissed President Iskandar Mirza. He became the sole governing authority and President. This set the precedent for military rule.

Public discontent had grown against Ayub Khan’s autocratic policies and his handling of the 1965 war with India. Anti-regime protests erupted nationwide in 1968 and 1969. Khan resigned on 25 March 1969 and handed control over to General Yahya Khan.

After the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, won a majority in Pakistan’s 1970 general elections, there were brazen attempts by the Pakistani military regime under President Yahya Khan to deny Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s democratic mandate to form the government. This led to a civil war breaking out in East Pakistan in March 1971. The failure of the Pakistani military command to contain the civil war enabled India to intervene to support East Pakistan’s independence movement in November and December 1971. This ultimately led to the secession of East Pakistan as the independent state of Bangladesh on December 16th, 1971, under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. This was an enormous blow to Pakistan, geographically shrinking the country and reducing its population significantly. On December 20th, 1971, President Yahya Khan transferred power to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who became the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator of what remained of Pakistan.

Bhutto assumed the mantle of President and later Prime Minister on December 20th under a new constitution, creating a semi-presidential system with broad executive powers. His leftist Pakistan People’s Party dominated politics thereafter.

On July 5th, 1977, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq seized power from Prime Minister Bhutto in a bloodless coup, following protests over election-rigging allegations. Bhutto was later convicted and executed on dubious charges, altering Pakistan’s trajectory significantly.

President Zia-ul-Haq was killed on August 17th, 1988, along with senior military commanders, when their plane exploded minutes after takeoff. Foul play was widely suspected but never proven. Zia’s death sparked fresh political instability and a renewed push for democracy.

Between 1988 and 1993, governments under Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif alternated through elections and power tussles. While representing tentative steps towards sustainable democracy, accusations of corruption and incompetence persisted during this period.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s push to replace army chief Pervez Musharraf prompted Musharraf to seize power on October 12th, 1999 in a bloodless coup while Sharif was overseas. Musharraf became President and Chief Executive. Sharif was later exiled after a treason conviction.

Musharraf resigned on August 18th, 2008 to avoid possible impeachment, after a coalition government took charge earlier in 2008 and his political allies deserted him. His rule had become untenable under combined opposition pressure and dismal popularity.

Civilian rule was restored, with the Pakistan Peoples Party’s Asif Ali Zardari becoming President. Later governments alternated between the PPP and Nawaz Sharif’s PML(N) through reasonably free and credible elections under an increasingly assertive judiciary.

Longtime opposition leader Imran Khan was elected Prime Minister in 2018, signalling a new political direction. Khan headed a PTI-led coalition government.

In 2022, Imran Khan’s government was removed after losing a no-confidence vote on April 10th. Shehbaz Sharif of PML(N) replaced him as Prime Minister on April 11th. Intra-government friction and pressure from the military establishment paved the way for Khan’s ouster.

3. Wars and Conflicts as Justification for Army’s Outsized Role:

Pakistan’s military has fought three major wars with India over the disputed territory of Kashmir—in 1965, and 1971 and the intense Kargil conflict in 1999. The 1965 and 1971 wars involved direct clashes between Pakistani and Indian forces over Kashmir, while the 1999 Kargil conflict saw Pakistani troops cross the Line of Control in Kashmir, sparking clashes. These wars bolstered the Pakistani Army’s domestic legitimacy as defenders of the nation against the traditional rival, India.

Besides these inter-state wars, the military has also been involved in suppressing domestic insurgencies and militancy within Pakistan. This includes launching operations to quell the separatist insurgency in resource-rich Balochistan province. It also includes Pakistan’s controversial role of actively supporting and arming the Afghan Taliban after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with active encouragement and funds from the United States. However, after 9/11 and the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan sided with the US as a key ally in the War on Terror, turning against the Pakistani Taliban and Al-Qaeda groups operating along the porous Af-Pak border areas.

The Pakistani military has used periodic eruptions of military tensions and security threats—both domestic and international—to justify its disproportionate dominance over Pakistan’s national security policies, budgets and nuclear doctrine. This has sidelined the foreign policy bureaucracy and civilian perspective in favour of a security-centric view driven by the military establishment.

4. The Military’s Economic Empire and Societal Reach:

As unchallenged rulers of Pakistan, the military generals have become the Moguls-in-Khaki of Pakistan. They control business assets worth over $100 billion in sectors like manufacturing, transport, and construction. The Army wields power over natural resources and real estate allocation, giving it intangible control over politicians and businesses. Public welfare initiatives and disaster relief by Army help it project a progressive outlook and win mass appeal for its activities. The military also runs schools, colleges and hospitals across Pakistan, giving jobs to those dependent on it for livelihoods and access to services. The Army has expanded infiltration into the everyday lives of citizens shaping public opinion.

5. Resilience Despite Periodic Setbacks:

Despite periodic criticism and pushback around its outsized role, the military has displayed remarkable resilience—recovering cohesion and public trust even after apparent setbacks. For instance, after the 1971 loss to India, which led to Bangladesh’s independence and surrender of its 93,000 troops to India, the Army soon rebuilt itself, presenting the conflict as a political failure, while promoting patriotism and Islam post-war. Again in the 21st century, when Gen Musharraf’s long rule ended, the Army accepted public anger over letting US forces capture Osama inside Pakistan. But it soon regained its image as the protector of sovereignty. For 75 years, the military has shaped Pakistani democracy and society through periods of both direct control and indirect influence from behind the scenes. Backed by business interests, it remains highly relevant despite periodic public disappointments.

Based on the evolving socio-political dynamics in Pakistan, there are signs that the military’s traditional stranglehold over governance is weakening. However, it may be premature to suggest a total loss of the army’s influence in the foreseeable future. A few key factors should be considered:

1. Public pushback against electoral manipulation in 2024 has definitely dented the army’s image as the ultimate arbiter. Imran Khan’s surge in popularity and defiance of the establishment has been a rare political challenge.

2. Younger, urban, middle-class electorate has led calls for genuine democracy rather than tacitly accepting army rule. This may progressively reduce the military’s public credibility and acceptance if it tries overt political interventions.

3. The military retains powerful levers and business interests permeating Pakistan’s economy and institutions. Its role in national security policymaking also remains pivotal. Deep state ties cultivated over decades won’t unravel easily.

4. Pakistan’s recurring financial crises and geostrategic vulnerabilities could enable future indirect military influence under the garb of restoring governance and sovereignty—their classic justification for political meddling.

5. Even if civilians consolidate political power going forward, they may have to strike deals with the generals sacrificing some foreign policymaking space and budgetary oversight to ensure functional governance. The odds are stacked against any civilian leader, even Imran Khan, completely shaking off the army tutelage. The Army has learnt its lessons and will do everything in its power to ensure that no politician with majority support ever becomes the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

While the overt political manipulation in 2024 backfired, signalling that the unelected establishment’s absolute power stands challenged, it may be overly optimistic to expect the military to lose all control. The decades-old power dynamic that has shaped the state’s trajectory cannot dramatically unravel in just one electoral cycle. An incremental rebalancing seems more likely than a sweeping loss of influence. Constitutional reforms could speed up civilian supremacy in Pakistan’s national affairs. But the military will certainly adapt to retain relevance through indirect channels. The stakes are too high for it to give up its hold on the levers of power.





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