Thursday, November 19, 2026

The Long Shadow of the Mafia: Crime, Politics, and the Erosion of the Indian Republic

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Threats to Arvind Kejriwal and Amitabh Bachchan have once again dragged the underworld into the glare of public attention. These are not isolated acts of bravado by fringe elements. They are symptoms of a deeper pathology: the persistent, corrosive nexus between organised crime and politics that has shaped India’s socio-political landscape for decades. The relatively soft handling of Lawrence Bishnoi and the Bishnoi Syndicate only sharpens the point. When a man operating from behind bars can still project fear across state boundaries and into the film industry, the problem is no longer one of policing capacity alone. It is one of political will, institutional compromise, and the quiet normalisation of criminal power.

India’s experience with organised crime is not a recent aberration. From the late 1960s onward, the figure of the bahubali—the local strongman who combined muscle, money, and political access—became a fixture of the democratic process. What began as localised protection rackets and smuggling networks evolved into sophisticated enterprises with national and international reach. Names that once dominated the underworld—Haji Mastan, Karim Lala, Varadarajan Mudaliar, Dawood Ibrahim, Chhota Rajan, Abu Salem, Manya Surve—did not operate in isolation from the political system. They financed campaigns, delivered votes through intimidation or patronage, and in return secured protection, contracts, and occasional legitimacy. Some of their successors and contemporaries moved directly into electoral politics. Mukhtar Ansari, Atique Ahmad, Brijesh Kumar Singh, and Dhananjay Singh illustrate the continuum: men whose criminal dossiers ran parallel to their political careers, and who treated legislative assemblies as extensions of their territorial control.

The contemporary landscape is dominated by a different cast, yet the underlying logic remains unchanged. Lawrence Bishnoi and the Bishnoi Syndicate have achieved a notoriety that extends beyond Punjab and Haryana into Canada and beyond. Goldy Brar and Neeraj Bawana represent the same phenomenon in different geographies. These networks thrive on the same mixture of caste and community solidarities, illicit economies (extortion, drugs, arms), and the ability to project violence across jurisdictions. What distinguishes the present moment is the brazenness with which threats are issued against high-profile political and cultural figures, and the apparent inability—or unwillingness—of the state to neutralise the threat at its source.

The “kid gloves” treatment of Bishnoi is particularly revealing. A prisoner who continues to issue threats, coordinate activities, and maintain a public mythology of invincibility is not merely a failure of prison administration. It points to the political utility of such figures. In certain electoral geographies, the capacity to deliver muscle or to intimidate opponents remains a valued asset. Parties of every ideological stripe have, at different times and in different states, found it expedient to tolerate or even cultivate relationships with strongmen. The result is a system in which the boundary between the criminal and the political is not a hard line but a permeable membrane. Enforcement agencies, aware of the political costs of decisive action, often default to containment rather than elimination. Cases drag on, witnesses turn hostile, and the spectacle of “encounters” or selective arrests substitutes for systematic dismantling of networks.

This arrangement has exacted a heavy price. First, it hollows out the rule of law. When citizens observe that certain criminals operate with relative impunity while ordinary accused face the full weight of the system, faith in institutions erodes. Second, it distorts democratic competition. Elections in several pockets of the country continue to be influenced by the ability of candidates to mobilise or neutralise local strongmen. The presence of candidates with serious criminal charges is no longer an exception; it has become a recurring feature of legislative assemblies. Third, it contaminates cultural and economic spheres. Bollywood’s long entanglement with underworld financing is well documented; the recent threats to a figure of Amitabh Bachchan’s stature demonstrate that the relationship has not been fully severed. Real estate, mining, and other sectors remain vulnerable to the same pressures.

The social consequences run deeper still. In regions where bahubalis have held sway, ordinary citizens learn to navigate a parallel system of authority. Police stations become places of last resort rather than first response. Local governance is filtered through networks of patronage and fear. Young men, seeing the status and material rewards that accrue to those who command violence, are drawn into the orbit of these gangs. The cycle reproduces itself across generations. What begins as a problem of law and order becomes a problem of political culture and social trust.

Critics of stronger action often raise legitimate concerns about due process, human rights, and the risk of excess by security forces. These concerns must be taken seriously. Yet the alternative—prolonged accommodation of criminal networks that openly challenge the state’s monopoly on legitimate violence—is not a defense of rights; it is their abandonment. A republic that cannot protect its elected leaders or its cultural icons from credible threats has already conceded a measure of sovereignty. The solution cannot be a return to the extrajudicial methods of the past, which created their own cycles of grievance and impunity. It requires something more demanding: sustained, intelligence-driven, multi-agency operations that target the financial and logistical underpinnings of these syndicates, combined with political consensus that no party will treat criminal muscle as a legitimate electoral resource.

Comparative experience is instructive. Societies that have successfully reduced the political influence of organized crime—Italy’s long struggle against the mafia, or Colombia’s eventual confrontation with cartels—did so only when the costs of accommodation became higher than the costs of confrontation. That shift required not only better policing but a change in the political calculation of elites. In India, the calculation remains skewed. The short-term benefits of alliance or tolerance continue to outweigh the long-term damage to institutional integrity. Until that equation is reversed, threats of the kind directed at Kejriwal and Bachchan will recur, each one a reminder of how thoroughly criminal power has been woven into the fabric of public life.

The historical record is unambiguous. From the smugglers and dockyard bosses of the 1960s and 1970s to the transnational networks of today, organised crime has adapted to every change in the political economy while retaining its core asset: the capacity to deliver results that formal institutions either cannot or will not. Politicians have repeatedly found it useful. The media has, at times, romanticised the underworld. Sections of the public have viewed strongmen as protectors against a distant or indifferent state. The cumulative effect is a normalisation that makes decisive action politically risky.

There is no single legislative fix or police operation that will resolve this. What is required is a sustained recognition that the presence of criminal networks inside the political system is not a peripheral problem but a central threat to the quality of Indian democracy. Law-enforcement agencies must be insulated from the very pressures that have long constrained them. Political parties must internalise that the short-term gains of criminal alliances are purchased at the price of long-term institutional decay. Civil society and the media must resist the temptation to treat underworld figures as colourful anti-heroes rather than as agents of predation.

The threats against Kejriwal and Bachchan are useful only if they force a clearer reckoning. They reveal that the distance between the underworld and the centres of power remains dangerously short. Lawrence Bishnoi is not an anomaly; he is the latest iteration of a pattern that has endured for more than half a century. Until the pattern itself is broken—through consistent enforcement, political restraint, and a refusal to treat muscle as a legitimate form of political capital—the menace will continue to shape India’s public life. The alternative is a slow, grinding erosion in which the formal institutions of the republic increasingly share space with parallel structures of violence and patronage. That is a price no democracy can afford to pay indefinitely.


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