The recent upheavals in Bangladesh and Nepal have revealed meddling by China and the United States in South Asia. In fact, there were military drills involving USA, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. China too is strengthening its clout in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bhutan. Is India incapable of protecting its interests in its neighbourhood. India must be the only major power in the world that has wilfully cut its own global status. From an aspiring leader of the Global South it has started resembling an isolated giant. Let us see how this has come about.
In the sweltering summer of 2024, Bangladesh erupted in a student-led uprising that toppled Sheikh Hasina's iron-fisted regime. This sent shockwaves through South Asia. Fast-forward to September 2025. Nepal's streets are ablaze with Gen Z-fuelled protests. Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli resigns. This is the third such upheaval in India's immediate neighbourhood after Sri Lanka's 2022 economic meltdown. These aren't mere domestic tremors; they expose a geopolitical chessboard where China and the United States are manoeuvring with impunity. And what about India? India—once the self-proclaimed hegemon of its "backyard"—watches from the sidelines, isolated and ineffective. The U.S.-Bangladesh "Tiger Shark" naval drills in August 2025 and multilateral "Pacific Angel" exercises with Sri Lanka underscore Washington's deepening footprint, even as Beijing inks deals with Dhaka's interim government under Muhammad Yunus. Is India being cornered in its own sphere? Absolutely. Is it incapable of safeguarding its interests? The evidence screams yes—a litany of foreign policy failures rooted in arrogance, inconsistency, and a refusal to evolve beyond the "big brother" delusion. New Delhi is adrift in a region it once dominated.
At the heart of India's woes lies a ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy. It sounds visionary but delivers vacuous rhetoric. It has turned out to be just another jumla. Launched in 2014, it promised connectivity, aid, and mutual prosperity, yet it has crumbled under the weight of unilateralism. Take Bangladesh: India's closest ally under Hasina received billions in lines of credit. The amount over $8 billion by 2024 meant for infrastructure like the Akhaura-Agartala rail link. But when protests turned violent, New Delhi's blind loyalty to a beleaguered autocrat backfired spectacularly. Hasina fled to India, branding Dhaka's new rulers as "Islamist radicals" and fuelling anti-India vitriol. Yunus's interim government, facing economic freefall, pivoted to China, securing $2 billion in loans and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) expansions by mid-2025. As for the U.S. meddling? Allegations swirl around USAID's role in "regime change”. There have been reports of funding opposition networks amid Washington's push for Bangladesh to join the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. India, meanwhile, boycotted Dhaka's outreach, opting for sulks over strategy. The result? Bilateral trade, once a bright spot, nosedived 15% in 2025, while China's influence surged via ports like Payra.
Nepal's crisis mirrors this folly, amplified by geography's cruel irony: the Himalayan buffer state sandwiched between two giants. Since 2008, Kathmandu has cycled through 14 governments, none completing a full term. This has bred chronic instability that India has exploited rather than stabilised. The 2025 protests, dubbed a "hashtag uprising," accuse Oli's coalition of corruption and Chinese overreach—Beijing's hydropower dams and debt now exceed $3 billion. Yet U.S. fingerprints are evident too. Experts link NGO funding to anti-China agitation, aiming to peel Nepal from Beijing's orbit. And what has been India's response? A ham-fisted blockade in 2015 over Madhesi rights still haunts memories. Recent border skirmishes in Lipulekh have reignited sovereignty fears. Prachanda's ouster in 2024 and Oli's fall expose New Delhi's failure to nurture a pro-India elite. Consequently, Kathmandu has successfully courted U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation grants for electricity transmission and road improvements. At the same time, it has been deepening BRI ties with China. Clearly, India's "dangerous neighbourhood" is self-inflicted—volatility arcs from Pakistan to Bangladesh, with Nepal as the latest flashpoint.
Economically, India's strategic shortsightedness is a masterclass in self-sabotage. China has weaponised debt diplomacy. It has ensnared neighbours in a $100 billion BRI web across South Asia by 2025, from Sri Lanka's Hambantota port to Pakistan's Gwadar. India counters with tepid gestures. SAARC's corpse lies buried since 2016's Islamabad summit boycott. The BBIN (Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal) initiative has stalled on connectivity red tape. Worse, in 2019, New Delhi withdrew from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, fearing Chinese imports. As a result it isolated itself from a $26 trillion market, leaving neighbours to integrate without India. China’s Global Times gloats: "India secludes itself from regional growth," a blunder that cedes economic high ground to Beijing. In Sri Lanka, post-2022 crisis, China's $2.9 billion bailout outpaced India's $4 billion lifeline, which came laced with equity demands on oil farms. U.S. exercises like Pacific Angel now fill the void, training Lankan forces in disaster response—precisely the soft power India squandered.
This isolation stems from a hegemonic hangover: India's size—1.4 billion people, $3.9 trillion GDP—breeds perceptions of bullying, not benevolence. Nikkei Asia nails it: "Misguided foreign policy has left India friendless," with smaller states hedging via neutrality; for example, Bhutan’s Chinese border talks, and Maldives' "India Out" campaign. Al Jazeera notes Dhaka's careful tread, rejecting a China-Pakistan axis but wary of New Delhi's asymmetry: "India's economy and foreign policy combine to overshadow neighbours." Even Bhutan, India's staunchest ally, faces Doklam 2.0 pressures, where 2025 standoffs highlight New Delhi's failure to deter Beijing.
Compounding this is India's inability to counter China's salami-slicing. The 2020 Galwan clash exposed military gaps, but regionally, Beijing's String of Pearls—encircling ports—goes unchecked. India's Quad dalliance with the U.S. alarms neighbours, seen as anti-China containment rather than inclusive security. The Foreign Affairs warns of a "next war" with Pakistan, fuelled by India's deterrence failures, while U.S.-India tensions over Bangladesh elections reveal strategic misalignment. Washington, once a bystander, now meddles aggressively: Trump-era tariffs hit Bangladesh, pushing it toward China, while Biden's Indo-Pacific pivot courts Colombo and Dhaka with drills. India responded with useless finger-pointing at "external hands" instead of building coalitions.
These failures aren't accidental; they're systemic. A bureaucracy mired in red tape, a foreign service understaffed for South Asia (only 900 diplomats for 200 missions), and the prime minister’s personalisation of diplomacy—grand hugs masking policy voids—cripple execution. The US based think-tank, Council on Foreign Relations, points out, "India is losing South Asia to China," limiting its global projection as resources bleed into border defences. The U.S., post-Afghanistan, fills the vacuum with "longstanding partnerships" like Tiger Lightning. The annual U.S.-Bangladesh affairs now eye "safer regions”, which is interpreted as a code for containing China, without India.
So, is India isolated? Unequivocally yes. Its backyard, once a sphere of influence, is a multipolar minefield where China builds, the U.S. drills, and New Delhi dithers. Incapable? In its current avatar, yes. It is trapped in a web of majoritarian nationalism and ego-driven foreign policy where the silly craving for vishvaguru status has undone all the good work done by the previous governments, especially during Dr. Manmohan Singh’s tenure. To reclaim the lost ground, India must shed arrogance: revive SAARC with economic teeth, offer debt relief without strings, and forge a true South Asian security architecture, and not just bilateral Band-Aids. Until then, the upheavals in Dhaka and Kathmandu aren't anomalies; they're harbingers of a region slipping from India's grasp. The big brother has become the bewildered bystander — a tragic, self-inflicted exile in its own home.
India, China, Pakistan, USA, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, USAID, Foreign Policy, South Asia, Subcontinent, Afghanistan, QUAD, SAARC, Manmohan Singh, Trump, Biden, Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, Al Jazeera, Nikkei Asia, Doklam, Bhutan, Global Times, Islamist Radicals, BRI, Gwadar, Hambantota
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