There is a fundamental question confronting Indian foreign policy today.
If the United States is no longer as invested in the Indo-Pacific as New Delhi once hoped…
if India is unwilling to become America’s junior partner against China…
and if Russia is no longer the superpower that once balanced Washington…
then where does India go from here?
The answer to that question may shape India’s place in the world for decades.
For years the picture looked simple.
America was the dominant power.
China was the principal challenger.
Russia was India’s old strategic partner.
And the Quad, comprising India, the United States, Japan and Australia, seemed a convenient way to manage China’s rise without signing a formal military alliance.
That world has gone.
America is more transactional.
China is economically formidable and strategically ambitious.
Russia still has nuclear weapons, energy and a large military, but it is not the Soviet Union.
And BRICS has grown into a much wider grouping. It now represents a huge share of the world’s people and output. It is also a very mixed club, with competing interests inside it. It doesn’t have NATO’s coherence nor the Non Aligned Movement’s philosophic underpinnings.
So what should India do?
Multi-alignment is an attractive alternative but faces challenges of credibility when the world is still accustomed to recognisable camps and alliances. India need not pick a camp merely because the world insists that everyone must belong to one. This is not fence-sitting but strategic realism.
India and China cannot be allies but they can trade even as border disputes are dealt with at various diplomatic and military levels. They can interact during BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
The two countries can cooperate. They can trade. Their leaders can meet. They can sit together in BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meetings. They can cooperate on various issues without becoming allies.
China’s relationship with Pakistan remains a serious problem for New Delhi. Its growing presence in the Indian Ocean matters for India’s maritime security. And India’s dependence on Chinese manufacturing inputs is still an uncomfortable vulnerability.
The recent thaw is best understood as stabilisation, not reconciliation. Trade has recovered. The big strategic differences have not. So India should engage China without trusting China.
Talking to a strategic rival is not irrational. When two large countries share a disputed border and deep economic ties, refusing to talk would be irrational. Dialogue is not dependence.
Coming to Russia, India has a long history of friendship and cooperation since the Soviet Union years. Today, the two countries need to sustain their relationship in such fields as energy, defence equipment, nuclear cooperation, and diplomatic space.
There are real reasons to keep the relationship. Energy. Defence equipment. Nuclear cooperation. Diplomatic space.
Of course, despite decades of institutional memory, India realises that the Soviet Union was a superpower which Russia is not. It still has formidable military and nuclear power. But its economy is far smaller than America’s or China’s. And its growing dependence on China is itself a warning to India.
However, Moscow can remain an important partner. It cannot be the foundation of India’s global strategy.
And America?
This is where things become complicated. India and the United States have the greatest overlap of interests on China. Washington sees India as a counterweight to China. But India does not want to become an American proxy. It sees China as a neighbour it must compete with, live with, and sometimes work with.
India cannot outsource its China policy to Washington. It should not fight somebody else’s war. The Quad is useful only because it does not require India to become a formal military ally of the United States. It offers cooperation in maritime security, technology, supply chains, disaster response and the wider Indo-Pacific. But uncertainty about American priorities has made over-reliance on the Quad uncomfortable if not untenable.
The solution is not to abandon America but to de-Americanise India’s strategic security. That means building enough Indian capability that partnership with Washington becomes a choice — not a necessity. This is where strategic autonomy stops being a slogan. Strategic autonomy means having enough national power to decide without being forced into somebody else’s camp.
India needs secure borders. A serious navy. Resilient supply chains. Energy security. Advanced technology. Access to Western capital and markets. Russian energy and defence cooperation where it still helps. Stable relations with the Gulf. Access to Central Asia. Africa. Southeast Asia.
And above all, a far stronger domestic economic and technological base. That and not any one partnership should be the foundation of Indian foreign policy.
This is where expansion of BRICS matters. Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, the UAE and others now sit with the original members. The group covers a very large share of global population and economic activity. BRICS should not become an anti-American military or ideological alliance. That would be a strategic disaster for India. Because an anti-Western BRICS would strengthen China’s leadership inside the group. India does not need another Chinese-led geopolitical structure.
India’s aim should be different.
BRICS should be a platform for a more representative world order and not a Chinese substitute for the American one.
India can support reform of global institutions. Greater voice for developing countries. Trade in national currencies where it makes economic sense. Development finance. Cooperation in energy, technology, health, agriculture and infrastructure. What India should resist is turning BRICS into a bloc whose main purpose is confrontation with the West.
New Delhi’s recent diplomacy has pointed in that more practical, inclusive direction. That is the wiser course.
So, what should be India’s role in the evolution of global order? India’s need not pick a pole, but become one.
No, not another empire. Not another ideological bloc. But a powerful, independent centre of gravity.
Imagine an India that keeps strategic partnerships with America and Europe, and still keeps functional relations with Russia and China. An India that works inside BRICS without becoming subordinate to Beijing. An India that stays in the Quad without turning the Quad into an Indian military commitment against China. An India that works with ASEAN. Deepens ties with Japan, Australia, South Korea and the Gulf. Builds stronger relationships with Africa and Latin America. And becomes indispensable to global supply chains.
That is Multi-alignment backed by national power. Non-alignment belonged to a bipolar Cold War. Multi-alignment belongs to a messy multipolar world.
However, foreign policy cannot paper over domestic weakness. No diplomatic manoeuvre permanently substitutes for economic power.
If India wants strategic autonomy, it needs technological autonomy. If it wants technological autonomy, it needs world-class universities and research. If it wants military autonomy, it needs a serious defence-industrial base. If it wants economic autonomy, it needs competitive manufacturing. If it wants diplomatic weight, it needs a much larger economic footprint across Asia, Africa and the developing world.
The foundation of Indian foreign policy is not the Foreign Ministry. It is the Indian economy.
The real question is not whether India should choose America, China or Russia. It is whether India can become strong enough that it does not have to choose.
The most interesting possibility is that we are not moving from an American order to a Chinese order. We may be moving toward something messier.
There are several centres of power comprising America, China, Europe, India, Japan and Russia. Then there are regional powers in the Middle East, and rising influence across Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Such a world will be less predictable. It may also give India an unusual opening. India has relationships with both the West and the developing world; a functioning democracy; a large English-speaking population; a huge market; a growing technology sector; and old connections with Russia, the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia. It gives India the essentials to become a great power.
So, India needs to do at least five things.
First: keep America close. Never become dependent on America.
Second: keep Russia engaged. Stop treating Russia as the strategic pillar of the past.
Third: engage China economically and diplomatically — and prepare, every day, for strategic competition with China.
Fourth: use BRICS to enlarge India’s voice in a multipolar world. Do not let it become a Chinese-led anti-Western bloc.
Fifth, and most important: build Indian power at home.
Strategic autonomy cannot be gifted by diplomats. It has to be paid for with economic strength, technological capability, military preparedness and political confidence.
The great mistake would be to think India’s choice is between Washington and Beijing.
India’s real choice is between becoming somebody else’s strategic partner or becoming a strategic power in its own right.
That is the doctrine India should now state with greater clarity.
Not anti-American.
Not anti-Chinese.
Not pro-Russian.
Unapologetically pro-Indian.
In a world where alliances are transactional and old certainties are fading, it may be India’s only sustainable strategy.
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